Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds by Wile, Philip H. et al.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 4
1-1-2004
Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds
Philip H. Wile
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Kathleen Cordova-Lyon
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Claude D. Rohwer
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip H. Wile, Kathleen Cordova-Lyon & Claude D. Rohwer, Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds, 35 McGeorge L. Rev.
319 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/4
Estoppel to Avoid the California Statute of Frauds
Philip H. Wile,* Kathleen C6rdova-Lyon** and Claude D. Rohwer***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ............................ 321
II. SEYMOUR AND ITS PROGENY ..................................................................... 325
III. THE IMPACT OF THESE INROADS ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS .............. 337
IV. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CASES ............................................................ 341
V. FULLER'S THREE FUNCTIONS REVISITED ................................................. 344
VI. MONARCO AND ITS PROGENY .................................................................... 344
V II. THE BROKER CASES ................................................................................. 355
VIII. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN ARTICLE 2 .................................................. 363
IX. THE CALIFORNIA PRINCIPLES AND THE RESTATEMENT ........................... 364
The statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud.' The statute of frauds
cannot properly be asserted as a defense when to do so would perpetrate a fraud.
2
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1. The history and functions of the writing requirement in the statute of frauds are reviewed in E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcrs § 6.1 (4th ed. 1998).
2. In Seymour v. Oelrichs, a unanimous California Supreme Court said:
The right of courts of equity to hold a person estopped to assert the statute of frauds, where such
assertion would amount to practicing a fraud, cannot be disputed .... It is not necessary, in
order to the existence of an equitable estoppel that there should exist a design to deceive or
defraud.... All that is meant in the expression that an estoppel must possess an element of fraud
is, that the case must be one in which the circumstances and conduct would render it a fraud for
the party to deny what he had previously induced or suffered another to believe and take action
upon."
106 P. 88, 94-95 (Cal. 1909).
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Everyone is opposed to fraud; however, the definition of fraud seems to be in the
eye of the beholder.3
In Seymour v. Oelrichs, decided in 1909, the California Supreme Court
enforced an oral contract of employment for a term of ten years, notwithstanding
the one-year provision in the California statute of frauds. The contract was
between the heirs of James G. Fair (who died in 1894 with great wealth derived
from his interest in the Comstock silver mine)5 and John Seymour, then captain
of detectives of the San Francisco police department. The court based its decision
on "equitable estoppel,' 6 explaining that "fraud" would occur if the employers
were permitted to avoid their oral commitment after Captain Seymour had
changed his position in reliance on the employers' express promise to provide a
written contract in the future.7 Seymour became a leading case in California and
other states where the estoppel doctrine has become a widely recognized basis for
enforcement of an oral contract despite the writing requirement of the statute of
frauds.
In this article we trace the development of the principle recognized in
Seymour to its present formulation in California, and under relevant sections of
the Second Restatement of Contracts. 8 It is our view that the principle is
significantly limited in California and that these limitations are necessary to
prevent judicial repeal of the statute of frauds, which was enacted in California
on the basis of policy considerations then and now viewed as important! It is our
view that section 139 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, read and applied
in its entirety, similarly limits the use of the same, or a similar principle as
equitable estoppel, recognized in that section. We see the limitations imposed on
the use of section 139, as explained in the section itself and the comments on that
section, as equally important. We believe some courts in other jurisdictions that
have considered the application of section 139 have failed to recognize and
properly apply these limitations.'
3. See James J. O'Connell, Jr., Boats Against the Current: The Courts and the Statute of Frauds, 47
EMORY L.J. 253, 308-09 (1998) (citing the often mentioned "mantra" that "the statute is meant to be a shield
protecting the innocent from fraud and not a sword whereby the shady perpetrate fraud").
4. 106 P. at 96. The current California statute of frauds is now found at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) (West
Supp. 2004).
5. In Silver Kings, Oscar Lewis, the author, refers to the estate of James G. Fair, a former Senator from
Nevada, as "one of the largest fortunes ever accumulated in the West." OSCAR LEWIS, SILVER KINGS 187
(1947).
6. Seymour, 106 P. at 96.
7. Id.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 90, 139 (1979).
9. See Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 743 P.2d 1279, 1288-92 (1987) (stating recent policy considerations
viewed as supporting continued enforcement of the writing requirement).
10. The early cases in which section 139 has been considered are collected in footnote 2 in the opinion of
the Alaska Supreme Court in Alaska Democratic Part), v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Alaska 1997).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 35
After brief preliminary comments on the history and purpose of the writing
requirement in the statute of frauds and the doctrine of equitable estoppel, both of
which were implicated in Seymour, we discuss in greater detail: (1) Seymour and the
subsequent California Supreme Court cases in which the principle recognized and
applied in Seymour has been further developed; (2) other California Supreme Court
cases in which relief was given under an oral contract, notwithstanding the California
statute of frauds, on the basis of what is now called "unjust enrichment;" (3)
Monarco v. LoGreco" and later cases in which the principle recognized in these
unjust enrichment cases was blended with the principle established in Seymour to
create a new but limited principle permitting enforcement of an oral contract
notwithstanding the statute of frauds based on reliance, where failure to enforce the
contract would result in unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment; (4) the
California Supreme court cases involving real estate brokers and agents, in which the
court has refused to apply the principles recognized in Seymour and Monarco, out of
what may be an excessive concern over judicial repeal of the statute of frauds; (5) use
of these principles under the statute of frauds in the Uniform Commercial Code;'2 and
(6) our views both as to the different principles used by the California courts in
factually different cases as well as how the California courts might benefit from a
careful use of section 139 of the Second Restatement, applied in its entirety, to add
clarity and definition to the principles recognized in Seymour and Monarco.
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
The statute of frauds was first enacted by the English Parliament in 1677 and
was brought to this country with the settlement of the colonies as a part of the
English law now referred to as the "common law.' 3 The statute of frauds serves
an evidentiary function.' 4 Perhaps this is its sole function, in which case clear and
convincing evidence or compliance with some other compelling evidentiary
standard to establish the existence of a contract could be logically viewed as an
appropriate substitute for a writing. If its sole purpose is evidentiary, the statute
of frauds should not preclude enforcement of an oral contract when the party
against whom it is to be enforced admits to its making and terms. However, this
11. 220 P.3d 737 (1950).
12. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977); CAL. COM. CODE § 2201 (West 2002).
13. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110, statutory
note (1979) [hereinafter Statutory Note].
14. See Statutory Note, supra note 13 (stating that [iun general the primary purpose of the Statute of Frauds
is assumed to be evidentiary, to provide reliable evidence of the existence and terms of the contract..."); see also
Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 93
(2001) (stating "[p]eople are terrible at recalling exactly what was said," and while they can generally remember
the gist, it is often distorted favorably to them); id. at 93 (recognizing, though discussed with respect to the parol
evidence rule, the justification for the statute of frauds as evidentiary is also premised on the fact that people often
cannot recall exact details); Peter E. Cummings, The Demise of the Integrity of Oral Contracts and Promises in
Lender-Borrower Relationships Under California Law, 2 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 21, 39 (1992).
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is not generally the situation'5 except under Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform
Commercial Code.'6
Some have opined that the statute, like other formal requirements, serves
additional functions such as a cautionary function and a channeling function.'7
The cautionary function, as explained by Professor Lon L. Fuller in his famous
article Consideration and Form, serves to prevent action on a promise not
carefully considered and is fulfilled only if we deny enforcement of contracts
against parties who have a change of heart before signing an appropriate
writing.' 8 If admission of the making of an oral contract is taken to be legal
justification for enforcement, then the cautionary function is not satisfied. The
channeling function, according to Fuller, "furnishes a simple and external test for
enforceability."' 9 If an oral contract is enforced when the promisor admits to
participating in the conversation but denies any intention to be bound at that time,
the channeling function is unfulfilled.
It has been over three centuries since the English Parliament enacted a writing
requirement for categories of contracts viewed as important.2° The wisdom of that
decision has apparently impressed state legislatures in the United States because
virtually all of them have enacted some writing requirements.2' While England has
substantially repealed the requirement of a writing,z2 American legislatures have
added to the list of subjects that require signed writings.23 It seems that American
legislators are focused upon what people should do (put these important contracts in
writing) in directing what they must do. Courts, not legislators, are left to face the
reality of what people actually do. Despite the mandates of our statutory laws, people
make oral contracts and proceed to order their affairs and conduct themselves in
reliance upon the other party's commitment to fulfill an oral agreement. The quest for
justice involves sorting out these situations and articulating a rationale for the
solutions deemed most appropriate.
15. But see Robert S. Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1952).
16. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201(3)(b), 2A-201(4)(b) (1977); CAL. COM. CODE §§ 2201(3)(b), 10201(e)(2)
(West 2002).
17. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
18. Id. at 800.
19. Id. at 801.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND STUDENT EDITION) OF CONTRACTS, statutory note (1982) (referencing
An Act for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 1677, 9 Car. 2, c.3 (Eng.)).
21. See generally Statutory Note, supra note 13 (referencing such legislation prior to the adoption of the
Second Restatement in 1981).
22. See Statutory Note, supra note 13 (discussing the repeal of most of the original English Statute of
Frauds); see also O'Connell, supra note 3, at 255 (explaining the rationale behind England's repeal of most of
its writing requirements). As England's Justice Stephen put it over a century ago: "[flaws ought to be adjusted
to the habits of society, and not to aim at remolding them." Id.
23. See Statutory Note, supra note 13.
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, equitable estoppel was recognized as
one type of "estoppel in pais," a concept developed after the time of Sir Edward
Coke, whose Institutes were published in the early seventeenth century.5 In the fifth
edition of his treatise on the Law of Estoppel, Bigelow, the leading nineteenth
century scholar, said, "[e]stoppel in pais arises (1) from contract, (2) independently
of contract, from act or conduct which has induced a change of position .... ,26 He
treated "estoppel by misrepresentation, or equitable estopper 27 as one type of
estoppel by conduct, saying:
The typical phase of estoppel by conduct is produced by misrepresentation;
and by misrepresentation is meant a false impression of some fact or set of
facts, created upon the mind of one person by another...28
He stated further:
[W]here the statement or conduct is not resolvable into a statement of fact
as distinguished from a statement of opinion or of law, and does not
amount to a contract, the party making it is not bound, unless he is guilty of
clear moral fraud, or unless he stood in a relation of confidence towards
him to whom it was made.29
This language suggests that equitable estoppel could be established either on
the basis of a misrepresentation of fact or a "clear moral fraud." Nowhere in the
treatise does Bigelow recognize or refer to estoppel based solely on a promise.
In Seymour v. Oelrichs,° the California Supreme Court recognized "equitable
estoppel" as a means by which to avoid the use of the statute of frauds as a
defense to enforcement of an oral contract. The court based its decision on the
plaintiff's detrimental reliance upon assurances given to him by those seeking to
employ him for a term of ten years that their oral employment agreement would
be reduced to a writing and executed in the future.3 The principle of enforcement
24. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND ITS APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
453-54; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "estoppel in pais" as "[tihe doctrine
by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting
a right which he otherwise would have had").
25. BIGELOW, supra note 24, at 454. The reference is to the Institutes of Lord Coke, a four volume work
published in 1628.
26. Id. at 453.
27. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). This language is referred to in Justice Angellotti's opinion in Seymour
v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88, 96 (Cal. 1909).
30. 106 P. at88.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
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based upon reliance, recognized in Seymour and similar cases in other jurisdictions,
was referred to in a comment dealing with the statute of frauds in the First
Restatement of Contracts that stated:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute [of Frauds], an estoppel
may preclude objection on that ground in the same way that objection to the
non-existence of other facts essential for the establishment of a right or a
defense may be precluded. A misrepresentation that there has been such
satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on the representation,
precludes proof by the party who made the representation that it was false;
and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise
to an effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to
defraud. 32
In Seymour and the California cases in which it was followed, the court has
referred to the principle as one involving equitable, not promissory, estoppel. But
in many cases the elements commonly required to create an equitable estoppel
33
were not present.
Forty-one years later, in Monarco v. LoGreco,3 the California Supreme Court
sought to expand the principle established in Seymour by applying it in the absence
of an express promise to supply a writing. Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous
court, said, "[i]n reality it is not the representation that the contract will be put in
writing or that the statute will not be invoked, but the promise that the contract will
be performed that a party relies upon when he changes his position because of it.
' 35
This or a similar principle was recognized in section 139 of the Second Restatement
and has been applied in several later California court cases, discussed below, as well
as in other jurisdictions.
Today the principle recognized in these two landmark cases is well established in
California case law, although questions remain as to certain aspects of the principle
and its application to the wide variety of circumstances in which it may be raised. 6
32. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. f (1932) (emphasis added).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29. Where the reliance is on a misrepresentation that a
sufficient writing exists, the appropriate doctrine would be equitable estoppel. Where the reliance is on an
express or implied promise to supply a sufficient writing, the appropriate doctrine would be promissory
estoppel.
34. 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950); see FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.12 (referring to Monarco as "[t]he
seminal case" which led to section 139 of the Second Restatement).
35. Monarco, 220 P.2d at 741.
36. See generally Jeff G. Carchidi, California Oral Will Contracts: The Decline of Testator Intent in the
Shadow of Equitable Estoppel, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1187 (1999) (discussing the application of estoppel in
the context of oral contracts to make or not revoke a will); Cummings, supra note 14 (analyzing cases involving
enforcement of oral financing agreements between lenders and farmers); Lawrence M. Boesch, Magnificent
Exceptions: Practitioners Can Sometimes Overcome a Statute of Frauds Defense by Asserting Equitable
Estoppel, 24 L.A. LAW. 38 (2001) (reviewing exceptions to the Statute of Frauds defense in the practice of real
property, employment law, business law, domestic relations and estate planning).
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While the principle established in Seymour was expanded in Monarco, that case and
subsequent California cases placed limitations on the use of reliance as a basis for the
enforcement of oral contracts. In California, the principle appears to be one of
somewhat more limited application than that recognized in a few cases from other
jurisdictions.37 But, we believe, it is consistent with the rule in Section 139 of the
Second Restatement."
Since Monarco, the California Supreme Court has decided only a limited
number of cases in which the principle established in Seymour and expanded in
Monarco has been implicated, upholding the application of the principle in some and
rejecting its application in others. At the same time there have been a large number of
cases in the California District Courts of Appeal39 that have sought to define and
apply the Supreme Court opinions. It is our contention that the principle, is subject to
limitations that have not always been recognized by the commentators.40 We believe
these limitations properly circumscribe the application of the principle, thus
preventing a virtual repeal the statute of frauds.
II. SEYMOUR AND ITS PROGENY
The development of new legal theories in the common law tradition is a case
by case process and the attractiveness of the facts of the specific case may affect
the process. The Seymour case involved a plaintiff whose situation cried out for
justice and defendants whose unseemly wealth and even more unseemly public
conduct strongly tempt one to engage in a bit of secret delight at the prospect of
watching them pay for their callous behavior.
The plaintiff in Seymour was a former captain of detectives in the San
Francisco police department, holding what the court described as "practically a
life position .... being removable therefrom only for good cause after trial."' In
that position he was earning a salary of $250 per month. Negotiating with
Captain Seymour were Charles Fair, a son of James G. Fair, and Herman
Oelrichs, the husband of Theresa Oelrichs, a daughter of James and sister of
Charles, acting on behalf of Theresa and her sister, Virginia Vanderbilt. 42 They
sought to induce Captain Seymour to give up his position with the police
37. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970); Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice, 934
P.2d 1313 (Alaska 1997).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 294-307.
39. Because only a limited number of opinions in cases decided by the California District Courts of
Appeal are released for publication, it is not possible to consider all of the decisions since Monarco in which the
District Courts of Appeal have considered or applied the principle established in Seymour, as expanded in
Monarco. Attention will be given in this article only to a few of the more significant cases in which the
principle has been used. See Cal. R. Court 976.
40. See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text.
41. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88, 93 (Cal. 1909). No further specifics are given in the court's opinion
as to the terms of Captain Seymour's employment, oter than his compensation.
42. Id. at91.
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department and accept a position as the overseer of the lands and buildings they
had acquired by inheritance from their father.43 The daughters had married well
and lived in the east."
Captain Seymour informed Charles and Herman that, because he had a life
position with the right to a pension if he remained with the police department long
enough, he would not consider a new position unless he was assured of steady
employment. 5 Charles and Herman informed Captain Seymour that he would be
given a ten year contract at $300 per month. An oral agreement was reached on those
terms.' Charles was to leave for Europe with his wife soon thereafter. The day before
Charles' departure, Captain Seymour, still employed in the police department,
inquired as to when he would be given the written employment contract promised by
Charles and Herman, and was informed by Charles that he could not prepare the
contract until his return but would do so at that time.47 Herman also assured Captain
Seymour that the written contract would be prepared and executed promptly upon
Charles' return.4' There is no suggestion in the court's opinion that either Charles or
Herman did not intend to supply the written contract at the time they promised
Captain Seymour that it would be prepared and executed after Charles' return from
Europe. In reliance on these assurances, Captain Seymour resigned his position with
the police department and commenced his employment under the oral agreement.49
The court's opinion refers to a notice signed by Charles S. Neal, another employee of
the Fair heirs, that stated:
To Whom It May Concern:
Mr. John F. Seymour is in our employ as superintendent of buildings, and is entitled as
our representative to admission to all our properties. We ask the kind consideration of
any of our tenants and others whom he may come in contact.
Very respectfully,
Fair Heirs.
"By CHARLES S. NEAL'O
43. Id.
44. Lewis says that Theresa (known as "Tessie") was married in 1890 to Herman Oelrichs (referred to in
the court's opinion as Hermann Oelrichs), a "thirty-seven-year-old bachelor and member of a prominent New
York and Newport family." LEWIS, supra note 5, at 180. Their wedding and the associated festivities were
described in the San Francisco Examiner as "the most brilliant social function in the city's history." Id. Lewis
says: "[tihe Fair-Oelrichs marriage elevated the two silver heiresses into national prominence and an acutely
interested public wondered if the younger sister [Virginia, (known as "Birdie")] would also make a brilliant
match." Id. She did, marrying William K. Vanderbilt, Jr., a grandson of Cornelius in 1899. Id. at 206. Lewis
says: "[t]he news that the bouncy, hoydenish Birdie Fair had carried off the nation's richest, and therefore most
eligible, bachelor enchanted the West." Id. at 206.
45. Seymour, 106 P. at 93.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 90.
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Unfortunately, Charles Fair and his wife were killed in an automobile
accident outside of Paris and never returned."' Charles' interest in the properties
owned by the Fair heirs passed to his sisters, Theresa and Virginia." On July 1,
1904, Captain Seymour's employment was terminated by Theresa and Virginia,
who had decided to sell the properties he was managing."
Captain Seymour brought suit against Theresa and Virginia to enforce the
oral employment agreement and recover damages for their repudiation of the
contract. They defended on the grounds that Herman lacked authority to bind
them to Captain Seymour's employment arrangement, and that the employment
contract was unenforceable, under the one-year provision of the California statute
of frauds.-4 Captain Seymour's response to the second claim was that the statute
of frauds defense was barred by estoppel."
51. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 209. The accident occurred as Charles was trying to beat a record claimed by
his brother-in-law, one of the Vanderbilts, who had taken up residence outside of Paris in Trouville, as to the
time needed to make the return drive to Paris. It occurred when one of the rear tires on Charles' new Mercedes
Special went soft while Charles was driving at an estimated 100 kilometers per hour. The car spun out of
control when Charles tried to stop and hit a tree. Charles and his wife were thrown out of the car and killed. Id.
at 208-09.
52. Seymour, 106 P. at 90. The sisters' right to Charles' share of the property was, however, disputed by
his wife's heirs who claimed that she had survived Charles and became entitled to his property as his surviving
spouse before her death. Bitter litigation between Charles' surviving sisters and his wife's heirs ensued. In a
negotiated settlement, reached after efforts to determine which of the spouses had survived the other were
unsuccessful, the surviving sisters received Charles' share of the property being managed by Seymour. LEwIs,
supra note 5, at 211-214. Without referring to the litigation with Seymour, Lewis says:
One final scene brings the saga of the Fairs to an appropriate close. The bodies of Charles and
his wife, sealed in lead caskets, with outer caskets of carved oak, were placed in an improvised
chapel on the steamer Saint Louis and brought to America. In New York the bodies were transferred
to a private car and dispatched across the continent, accompanied by Charley's two sisters, his
brother-in-law, William K. Vanderbilt, Jr., two maids, and a valet. No member of [the wife's] family
was with the funeral party, but several were present on the morning of September 12 when the
bodies were sealed in niches in the Fair mausoleum at Laurel Hill.
One incident marred the burial ceremony. Not only relatives and friends, but a huge crowd of
curious had gathered at the vault. As the services ended, an unidentified spectator stepped forward
and picked a rosebud from the nearest of the imposing array of floral pieces. Another onlooker
followed this lady's lead, then another, then several together. With startling suddenness the trickle of
souvenir-hunters became a stream, the stream became a river, and the river a tidal wave. In the melee
that followed, scores of elaborate floral tributes were ripped apart and trampled underfoot. When, ten
minutes later, a squad of policemen reached the scene, the mob had disbursed, leaving the area about
the vault "looking as though it had been lashed by a hurricane."
Id. at 214-215.
53. Seymour, 106 P. at 93. Considering the events that followed two years later when San Francisco was
devastated by an earthquake and a resulting fire that undoubtedly destroyed a large percentage of the Fair
properties, the sisters' decision to dispose of the properties may go down in the history of San Francisco as one
of the best investment decisions ever made. Unfortunately, Captain Seymour was a victim of their choice.
54. Id. at 90. Why Captain Seymour did not join Herman as a defendant seeking recovery from him in
the alternative based on his misrepresentation of his agency authority is not explained in the court's opinion.
The court's opinion makes it clear that Herman represented to Captain Seymour that he was authorized to act on
behalf of Teresa and Virginia in the negotiations that produced the employment contract. If, in fact, he lacked
such authority, giving Teresa and Virginia a defense, as they claimed, the representation might have been a
fraudulent misrepresentation of fact by Herman.
55. Id. at 93-94.
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The trial court ruled in favor of Captain Seymour, 6 finding the contract
enforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court concluded that the written
notice signed by Charles S. Neal on behalf of the Fair heirs and a letter to
Captain Seymour signed by Charles Fair satisfied the writing requirement,
Captain Seymour was awarded damages of $11,100.5' The defendants appealed
asserting that the writings relied upon by the trial court were not sufficient to
satisfy the statute and claiming that Herman lacked authority to enter into a
contract with Captain Seymour on behalf of Theresa and Virginia. 8 Captain
Seymour contended that he should be entitled to recover on an estoppel theory,
based on his reliance on the promises made by Charles and Herman that he
would be given a written contract upon Charles' return from Europe.59
Initially, in an opinion by Justice Sloss dated July 6, 1909, the California
Supreme Court concluded that the writings were not sufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds and that a new trial was needed on the issue of whether Herman
had authority to enter into the contract with Captain Seymour on behalf of
Theresa and Virginia. 60 The court did not address the estoppel claim. In
December, 1909, for unexplained reasons, the California Supreme Court
reconsidered the matter. It issued a further opinion authored by Justice Angellotti
adopting the opinion of Justice Sloss but dealing at length with Captain
Seymour's claim based on estoppel, assuming that the question regarding
Mr. Oelrich's authority was resolved in Captain Seymour's favor in the trial
court. On the estoppel issue the court concluded that, if the authority issue was
56. Id. at 90. The trial court's decision in Seymour's favor should have come as no surprise, given the
reputation of James G. Fair as an unscrupulous, grasping landlord of great wealth, and the reputation of his son,
Charles, as a playboy. Perhaps confirming the appropriateness of this reputation Lewis describes Charles'
conduct during the middle years of his marriage as follows:
That young man's weakness for the bottle, which he had kept under reasonable control during
the early period of his married life, again got out of hand. To cope with these recurring
emergencies, his wife entered into a working agreement with Captain Lees of the San
Francisco police department by which Lees periodically searched through the city's cafes and
rooming-houses, located the missing husband, and returned him to the Van Ness Avenue flat.
For this chore he is said to have received a monthly fee of five hundred dollars. It was money
well expended. As time passed, Charley's falls from grace grew less prolonged and frequent.
The entire city applauded.
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 206-07. Also weighing against the defendants was the great admiration the San
Francisco community had for Captain Seymour.
57. Seymour, 106 P. at 90. The trial court determined this amount by subtracting from the compensation
for the balance of the term of the contract lost by Seymour as a result of his termination the amount of his
earnings from new employment obtained by him after the termination. The propriety of this determination was
challenged by the defendants and considered and approved by the Supreme Court in its opinion. Id. at 96-97.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 93.
60. Id. at 92.
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resolved in Captain Seymour's favor, his claim based on equitable estoppel was a
good one."
A subsequent trial, in 1910, resulted in a judgment for Captain Seymour
based on a finding that written powers of attorney signed by Theresa and
Virginia in favor of Herman were sufficient to confer on him the authority to
make the commitments made on their behalf to Captain Seymour. The court
awarded Captain Seymour $11,100, plus interest from November 17, 1904, the
date on which he was discharged.62 On an appeal by the defendants, the
California Supreme Court ruled that the award of prejudgement interest was
improper and affirmed a reduced judgement for $11,100.63 A satisfaction of
judgment was filed by Captain Seymour's attorney on April 18, 1912, and the
case was closed.'
In his opinion in Seymour, Justice Angellotti referred to cases from several other
jurisdictions that, "show that the mere fact that there was no misrepresentation of
fact, but only a promise of future action, is not always a bar to equitable relief."6 He
explained:
The right of courts of equity to hold a person estopped to assert the
statute of frauds, where such assertion would amount to practicing a
fraud, cannot be disputed. It is based upon the principle "thoroughly
established in equity, and applying in every transaction where the statute
is invoked, that the statute of frauds, having been enacted for the purpose
of preventing fraud, shall not be made the instrument of shielding,
protecting, or aiding the party who relies upon it in the perpetration of a
fraud or in the consummation of a fraudulent scheme." 66
61. Because the opinion of Justice Sloss in the prior determination was fully incorporated in the court's
opinion on reconsideration of the case, it was not separately published. The report of the case gives no hint as to
the circumstances under which the California Supreme Court reconsidered the case. The published opinion
deals with the issue of the appropriate damages as well as the estoppel issue. The court's action in dealing with
these two issues before the trial court conducted a new trial on the question as to Mr. Oelrichs's authority is
surprising, judged by today's standards of appellate review. Id. at 93-94.
62. The entry of judgment is shown in the Docket for Superior Court in and for the City and County of
San Francisco. Only the Docket maintained by the clerk's office can be found. The other records of the case are
no longer in existence. Letter from Linda Gorman, Court Manager, Records Division (Aug. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter Gorman Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
63. Seymour v. Oelrichs II, 122 P. 847 (Cal. 1912).
64. Gorman Letter, supra note 62. The spectacle of a family of great wealth and position involved in
litigation that lasted for six years and involved two separate appeals to and three separate opinions of the
California Supreme Court over $11,100 might have been a factor in the court's willingness to make new law in
the name of applying an established principle not factually appropriate.
65. Seymour, 106 P. at 95.
66. See id. at 94 (quoting 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 921).
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Quoting from Glass v. Hulbert,6 he said:
The fraud most commonly treated as taking an agreement out of the
statute of frauds is that which consists in setting up the statute against its
enforcement, after the other party has been induced to make
expenditures, or a change of situation in regard to the subject-matter of
the agreement, or upon the supposition that it was to be carried into
execution, and the assumption of rights thereby acquired; so that the
refusal to complete the execution of the agreement is not merely a denial
of rights which it was intended to confer, but the infliction of an unjust
and unconscientious injury and loss. In such case, the party is held, by
force of his acts or silent acquiescence, which have misled the other to
his harm, to be estopped from setting up the statute of frauds. 6
Recognizing that there was no misrepresentation of fact by the defendants,
which was essential to the recognition of an equitable estoppel under Bigelow's
formulation of the rule, Justice Angellotti, quoting from an Indiana Supreme
69Court case, said:
It is not necessary, in order to the existence of an equitable estoppel, that
there should exist a design to deceive or defraud.... All that is meant in
the expression that an estoppel must possess an element of fraud is, that
the case must be one in which the circumstances and conduct would
render it a fraud for the party to deny what he had previously induced or
suffered another to believe and take action upon.' °
The concept of fraud adopted and used by the California Supreme Court in
Seymour, and by courts in other jurisdictions that have recognized this use of
estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds, is not consistent with the standard concept
of fraud under either contract or tort law.7 On the facts in Seymour, it appears
clear that both Charles Fair and Herman Oelrichs did, in fact, intend to provide
67. 102 Mass. 24, 35 (1869).
68. Seymour, 106 P. at 94 (emphasis added).
69. Anderson v. Hubble, 93 Ind. 570, 576 (1884).
70. Seymour, 106 P. at 94 (emphasis added).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (1979). The Second Restatement of Contracts
defines fraudulent misrepresentation as follows:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his assertion to induce a party to manifest his
assent and the maker
(a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or
(b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion.
Id. There is a somewhat similar definition in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). A
"misrepresentation" is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1979) as "an assertion that is
not in accord with the facts."
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the written contract promised when the promises and assurances of such a
contract were made. Only Charles' death and Herman's apparent change of heart
prevented performance of their promise. Captain Seymour was relying on the
assurances that he would receive a written contract, as well as performance of
that contract, when he made a substantial change of position by resigning his
position with the San Francisco police department and commencing his
employment with the heirs of Frank G. Fair before he had the written contract he
had been promised.72 As the statements from the court's opinion quoted above
demonstrate, the California Supreme Court, like those courts in other
jurisdictions on which Justice Angellotti relied, understood that they were using a
different concept of fraud as the basis for their reliance on equitable estoppel.3
The court noted that the defendants' argument that equitable estoppel could not
be based upon a mere promise "presents the most doubtful question in this
case."74 Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded:
While the question is by no means free from doubt, we believe that it should
be held that there were sufficient facts in this case to support a conclusion
that the promise here to give a written agreement as was required by the
statute was made under such circumstances that the irrevocable surrender by
the plaintiff of his position in the police department in full reliance thereon,
made it, in the eye of equity, a binding contract, the subsequent repudiation
of which by defendants would constitute such a manifest fraud as would
justify the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.75
This use of "equitable estoppel" based on a promise, through a finding of a
most atypical type of fraud, is reminiscent of Ricketts v. Scothorn,76 the 1898 case
decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, thought to be one of the first
72. Seymour, 106 P. at 93.
73. On the facts in Seymour, the only possibility of actual fraud would have been in the possibility that
Herman Oelrichs was misrepresenting his authority to act of behalf of Theresa and Virginia in the negotiation
and agreement with Captain Seymour. Because the authority issue was resolved in Captain Seymour's favor,
this could not be the basis of actual fraud. From the facts given in the court's opinion and the final result of the
litigation, the representations and assurances that there would be a written contract supplied by Charles and
Herman were not fraudulent in the usual contract or tort sense of that term. What created the "fraud" in Seymour
was the termination of Seymour's employment and the effort by Theresa and Virginia, as defendants, to avoid
enforcement of the oral agreement under the Statute of Frauds, long after Captain Seymour's reliance on the
oral promises to supply a written contract. There was no evidence or allegation in Seymour that either Charles
Fair or Herman Oelrichs harbored any intent when the promises of a writing were made to defend an action by
Captain Seymour to enforce the oral agreement based on the Statute of Frauds. Such an intent would have made
the assurances of Charles and Herman of a writing a misrepresentation of present intention which, under
Bigelow's formulation, would provide an alternative ground for estoppel or allow a recovery in tort. See id.;
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 122 P. 847 (Cal. 1912).
74. Seymour, 106 P. at 95.
75. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
76. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
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promissory estoppel cases of record." In that case, the court enforced a gratuitous
promise based on the promisee's detrimental reliance on the promise, referring to
the principle of equitable estoppel. Although many of the California Supreme
Court cases that followed Seymour continue to refer to the principal as one
involving "equitable estoppel, '78 the court based its decisions on the doctrine now
called "promissory estoppel. ' ' 79 This conclusion is consistent with the note in the
First Restatement which refers to the principle recognized in cases like Seymour
as promissory estoppel .5
The use of promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds, although based
on the promisee's reliance, is quite different from promissory estoppel under
section 90 as envisioned by the authors of the First Restatement. Promissory
estoppel under section 90 as adopted in the First Restatement was originally
intended as a substitute for consideration to broaden the enforcement to
gratuitous promises made most commonly in a family setting, on which the
promisee reasonably and foreseeably relied to his or her detriment.8  Even as
expanded since its original adoption, the principle now stated in section 90 still
serves to overcome the need for a bargained exchange, in cases where fairness
82and equitable considerations dictate enforcement of the promise.
77. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 2.19.
78. The most recent example, in 1998, is Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
79. Professor Farnsworth writes: "[tlhe first courts to apply the then novel doctrine of promissory estoppel
sought to mask their creativity by purporting to apply the established doctrine of equitable estoppel. But preclusions,
like relinquishments, are fundamentally different from commitments, and equitable estoppel, which results in a
preclusion, is fundamentally different from promissory estoppel, which results in a commitment." E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRE=TED DECISIONS 170 (1998) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH,
CHANGING YOUR MIND].
80. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29, 33. Although the California Supreme Court was, perhaps, rather
slow to recognize and adopt section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts, it had, by 1950, recognized the section
and its significance. See Bard v. Kent, 122 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1942) (Justice Traynor referred to section 90, noting that the
defendant in that case had not based its defense on promissory estoppel, nor was the requisite promise shown). In 1953,
the court recognized and used section 90 in Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles, 255 P.2d 772 (Cal. 1953). And in
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1955), the court, through an opinion by Justice Traynor, used section
90 in its landmark decision on reliance as a basis for barring revocation of a subcontractor's bid prior to acceptance by
the general contractor.
81. Debate on Section 88 (Later Section 90) of the Restatement of Contracts, 4 A.L.I. Proc. 85-114 (1926),
PETER LINZER, A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGy 338-349 (2d ed. 1995). In Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation District, the
California Supreme Court similarly characterized promissory estoppel, saying:
The purpose of the doctrine is to make a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without
consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange. If the promisee's
performance was requested at the time the promisor made his promise and that performance was
bargained for, the doctrine [of promissory estoppel] is inapplicable.... There is no occasion,
therefore, to rely upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which is necessary only to supply
consideration for a promise when no actual consideration was given by the promisee.
449 P.2d 462,468-69 (Cal. 1969).
82. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191,
1194-98 (1998). The portion of the Second Restatement that includes section 90 is titled, "Contracts without
Consideration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
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In this application promissory estoppel is being used to soften the perceived
harshness of the requirement of a bargain, as developed in the common law
tradition. The estoppel recognized in Seymour is being used to avoid the
application of a statutory writing requirement enacted by the legislature. This
distinction must be recognized in evaluating the principle and the limitations
placed on that principle. The proper role of common law courts includes
modifying and discarding common law contract rules made by those courts.
Although the courts must interpret the statutory writing requirement, they may
not repeal it or interpret it out of existence.
Three years after its decision in Seymour, the California Supreme Court
refused to apply estoppel to enforce an oral agreement where the defendants
promised to perform services for an agreed compensation as a subcontractor for
the plaintiffs who had a contract with the federal government to carry mail in the
Susanville area. The court concluded that the elements for use of estoppel had not
been shown. 3 Although the parties had orally agreed to reduce their oral contract
to writing, thus implicating Seymour, the court concluded that the plaintiffs'
conduct in reliance on the oral agreement was not reasonably foreseeable by the
defendants.'
In Notten v. Mensing,8 decided in 1935, the California Supreme Court
considered application of the principle recognized in Seymour in the context of
an oral agreement to make a will. In 1905 California added to the list of
transactions subject to the writing requirement in the statute of frauds, "an
agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or to make any provision for any
person by will. 8 6 The plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on property
acquired by the defendants under the will of the decedent, based on an oral
agreement between the decedent and her predeceased husband." Under that
agreement, the predeceased spouse's property was to be left to the surviving
spouse and then, at the survivor's death, in equal shares to the families of the two
spouses. Wills to accomplish this were executed. Under the husband's will, upon
the husband's prior death his property passed to his surviving wife who accepted
83. Long v. Long, 122 P. 1077 (Cal. 1912).
84. "[I]t is not alleged that it was necessary for plaintiffs or either of them to leave Susanville when they
ceased to carry the mails, or that they informed defendants that they intended to do so.... or that the defendants
had knowledge of any such necessity or purpose .... There is, therefore, nothing upon which the supposed
estoppel can rest." Id. at 1079; see also, Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 71 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1937); Zellner v.
Wassman, 193 P. 84 (Cal. 1920).
85. 45 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1935).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) (repealed). This inclusion was removed in 1985, because by then the
California Probate Code contained a similar requirement. Now California Probate Code section 21700 deals
exclusively with "a contract to make a will or other instrument, or not to revoke a will or devise or other
instrument, or to die intestate," permitting proof of such a contract in several different ways, including a
"writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract." See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
87. Notten, 45 P. 2d at 199.
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the benefits of that property until her death.8 ' Before her death the surviving wife
changed her will and left her estate, which included the property acquired from
her predeceased husband, to her family to the exclusion of the plaintiffs who
were members of the husband's family.89 Quoting Seymour, the court wrote: "In
order to raise the estoppel, fraud in some form is essential, but it is not required
that an actual intent to defraud or mislead exist; all that is required is that there
exist 'a fraud inhering in the consequence of setting up the statute." '9° The court
continued:
The mere fact that the wills are reciprocal or contain similar or identical
provisions, or that they were executed at the same time and before the
same witnesses, is not of itself sufficient evidence of the alleged oral
agreement.... However, if such agreement is proved by full, clear, and
convincing evidence, such agreement should be enforced according to its
terms.9'
Notten v. Mensing was the first case in which the California Supreme Court
applied the principle recognized in Seymour in the context of a claim by a third
party beneficiary of the oral agreement. Without noting this distinction, the court
awarded the remedy sought by the beneficiary of the oral agreement, based on
the surviving spouse's acceptance of the benefits conferred upon her under her
predeceased husband's will. There is no reference in the opinion to facts showing
reliance by the husband on the oral agreement other than the reliance inherent in
his execution of a reciprocal will in favor of his wife. The court characterized the
result as one required to prevent fraud.92 There were no facts shown to support the
conclusion that the surviving wife intended, at the time the oral agreement was
made, to modify her will in the event that her husband predeceased her, to
eliminate any disposition to the plaintiffs. In short, there was no true fraud in the
traditional sense. This confirms the conclusion that the concept of fraud
developed in these cases is far different from the classic concept recognized in
other areas.93
Notten v. Mensing was also the first case in which the court expressly
required proof of the oral agreement by "full, clear, and convincing" evidence.
The court relied on Seymour without noting that in Notten there was no proof of
an express promise to supply a writing confirming the oral contract. However,
there were promises by both spouses to execute the wills needed to perform the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 202 (citations omitted).
91. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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contract.94 The court's willingness to enforce the oral agreement not to revoke
based on "full, clear, and convincing" evidence of that agreement created an
alternative to the writing requirement. This alternative has recently been included
in the California Probate Code provisions dealing with contracts to make wills
under which such a contract can be established without a writing where the
contract is shown by "clear and convincing evidence." 95
As Justice Traynor observed later in Monarco,96 the Notten court recognized
that reliance was based upon the substantive promise to perform the act for which
the plaintiff bargained. Reliance was not based upon the promise to produce a
writing evidencing the oral contract.97 However, these early cases suggest that the
"full, clear, and convincing evidence" requirement was being applied only where
there is either no promise to supply a writing confirming the oral agreement, as in
Seymour, or a representation that a writing exists. Later decisions, without
articulating such a distinction in the analysis, appear to bear this out. In Vierra v.
Periera9s the plaintiff relied upon defendant's promise to reduce to writing an
oral agreement to extend a lease of real property. Based upon this, the court
enforced the oral agreement under the principle established by Seymour.9 No
mention of the need for "full, clear, and convincing evidence" was made in the
court's opinion. '°°
94. Notten, 45 P.2d at 199.
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (West Supp. 2004). In Wilson v. Bailey, 65 P.2d 770 (Cal. 1937), that
court enforced an oral extension of time within which to exercise an option to repurchase property given to the
plaintiff by one of the defendants, who refused to confirm the extension in writing, but did so orally to the
plaintiff in the presence of a bank officer who testified as to the agreed extension. Id. at 771. Unlike Seymour,
there was no promise or assurance by the defendants that the oral extension would be put in writing. On the
contrary, the defendant who promised the extension refused to supply a writing when requested to do so. Id.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the "full, clear, and convincing evidence" test from Notten v. Mensing
had been met. Relying on Seymour, the court enforced the oral extension on the ground that the plaintiff had
relied to her detriment on it and permitting the defendants to use the statute of frauds as a defense would create
a fraud. Id. at 773.
96. Monarco v. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737, 741 (Cal. 1950).
97. Notten, 45 P.2d at 199.
98. 86 P.2d 816 (Cal. 1939).
99. According to the testimony, a request was made by plaintiffs that the lease be put in writing, but the
defendant husband stated that it was not necessary, that his word was "good." Id. at 817. This statement would
be the equivalent of a promise not to defend an action to enforce the lease by use of the Statute of Frauds, and
would thus come within the principle established in Seymour.
100. See Halsey v. Robinson, 122 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1942), in which the court enforced an oral agreement in
which the defendants promised to provide the plaintiffs with a new lease for a term of five years of property
they held under an existing lease, relying on Seymour and Notten. The plaintiff (seeking possession of the
property in the action) orally agreed to the new lease and then informed the defendants ("farming people of
limited education,") that it would be necessary for them to execute a quitclaim deed to the property in favor of
the plaintiff to clear the existing lease. Id. at 11. The defendants complied and the plaintiff then refused to
provide the new written lease, claiming ownership of the property free of any interest in the defendants. Id. This
appears to be the only one in this line of cases involving actual fraud by the party seeking to avoid enforcement
of the oral agreement. See also Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 71 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1937).
335
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Finally, in Wilk v. Vencill,'' the court reversed the trial judge's judgment on
demurrer against a buyer of residential property from the defendant spouses
seeking to specifically enforce his oral contract to purchase the property. A
written contract had been signed by the defendant husband, but not by his wife. 'O
At the time the oral contract was made the defendant spouses were attempting to
negotiate a property settlement incident to their divorce.' 3 The buyer, an
attorney, 'O' alleged that the defendant wife orally agreed to sign the written sale
contract as soon as the property settlement was finalized. She then refused to sign
after she was advised that the buyer could not enforce her oral promise to sell.'0 5
The buyer further alleged that, in reliance on the wife's assurance that she would
sign the written contract and with her knowledge, he passed up an opportunity to
purchase another home in the neighborhood that was available for purchase and
discontinued his efforts to find other property in the area.'" Significantly, the
buyer also alleged that, with her consent or acquiescence, he had obtained access
to the home to make improvements in reliance on the wife's oral promise, a fact
that could have permitted him to enforce her oral agreement under the part
performance doctrine. '° The California Supreme Court made no mention of this
possibility. Instead in its decision, the court relied on the "doctrine of estoppel,"
without characterizing it as either equitable or promissory. Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Traynor, who three years later was the author of the
court's opinion in Monarco, said:
The doctrine of estoppel is not destructive of the statute of frauds....
Without the qualifying doctrine of estoppel in a proper case the statute
would encourage rather than prevent the perpetration of frauds....
Plaintiff must still establish the truth of his allegations, and if he does not
prove the contract, the reliance, and the change of position by a
preponderance of the evidence, he cannot recover.' °8
The fact that Wilk v. Vencill was decided only three years before Monarco
and the fact that the opinion was written by Justice Traynor make the case
significant. According to the plaintiff's allegations, the defendant wife promised
to supply the required writing in the future. In this respect, the case is like
Seymour. The promise of a writing may also distinguish the case from Notten,
and explained why the standard of proof that the court required was less than it
101. 180P.2d 351 (1947).
102. Id. at 353.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 354.
107. Id. at 353.
108. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
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required under the "full, clear, and convincing" standard prescribed in Notten.
Indeed, Justice Traynor's clear statement is that the standard of proof in the case
is "by a preponderance of the evidence."'" This appears to confirm the rule
suggested above, that a court shall impose the "full, clear, and convincing
evidence" standard only where there is no secondary promise of a writing or
representation that a writing exists or is unnecessary."O
The rather surprising feature of Wilk v. Vencill is that the court was willing to
apply the estoppel principle in ruling for the plaintiff, an attorney who might be
expected to know that his contract was not enforceable without the wife's
signature, based on his allegation of what appears to have been a rather minor
change of position in reliance on the oral contract, failing to attribute any
significance to the improvements made to the property by the plaintiff. The
comparison to later cases denying contract enforcement to real estate brokers
who substantially relied upon oral listing agreements is noteworthy."' Wilk v.
Vencill did involve a promise to supply the required writing, making the case one
like Seymour. In Monarco, where there was no such express secondary promise,
the court predicated its decision to enforce the decedent's oral promise on the
"unconscionable injury" that the promisee would suffer and the unascertainable
"unjust enrichment" that the promisor's beneficiary would enjoy, if the oral
promise was not enforced. It seems difficult to conclude that the loss the plaintiff
suffered in Wilk v. Vencill was "unconscionable," or that the wife's refusal to join
in the sale would result in her "unjust enrichment." And yet Justice Traynor
inexplicably cited Wilk v. Vencill in Monarco as a case in which the court
enforced an oral promise to avoid "unconscionable injury."
'
"
2
III. THE IMPACT OF THESE INROADS ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The statute of frauds is one of several types of formalities that justice systems
have used since at least Roman times. The requirement of a writing serves an
evidentiary purpose by providing the trier of fact with tangible evidence of the
agreement and its terms." 3 While not as effective as a seal or a requirement of
notarization, a writing signed by the party to be charged also serves some
cautionary purpose. When one makes an offer to buy a house for a stated sum,
the owner can quickly say: "I'll take it." But when the buyer reduces the
agreement to writing and proffers it to the owner for signature, there is time for
the owner to inhale deeply and think whether this is really something that the
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part VII.
112. Monarco v. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 1950).
113. See Statutory Note, supra note 13.
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owner wishes to sign. Wilk v. Vencill ' is a case very much like that suggested.
When the defendant wife was presented with a written contract containing the
terms to which she had orally agreed, she refused to sign it until a property
settlement with her husband was finalized.' 5 In permitting enforcement of the
oral agreement, the California Supreme Court did not expressly consider the
cautionary function as a basis for enforcing the statute of frauds. However, the
fact that the sellers observed and acquiesced in the buyer's acts in reliance on the
oral contract would indicate that she did have time to consider her commitment.
In his article Consideration and Form,"6 Fuller quoted from earlier writers in
observing that a formality such as a writing also serves the purpose of facilitating
judicial diagnosis as to whether the parties intended enforceability or intended
any legal consequences by their words and conduct." 7 By its decision in Wilk v.
Vencill, the court also failed to recognize or give credence to this channeling
function.
The focus of the writing requirement is upon the promisor against whom the
action for enforcement is being brought."" The writing furnishes evidence of the
promisor's expression and intention; the requirement of a writing introduces
some cautionary or contemplative period to protect the promisor, and the
requirement of a writing also provides a negative channeling function sorting out
those promises (those not reduced to writing) that the law does not find to be of
sufficient importance to enforce.
The preceding section analyzed the early California development of reliance
by the promisee as a basis for enforcing an oral contract notwithstanding a
writing requirement. Enforcement of oral contracts based upon reliance changes
the entire focus of the analysis." 9 The writing provides evidence of the contract.
Reliance has some evidentiary value indicating the existence of an actual
contract, but in many cases it is merely evidence of what the promisee thought
she heard or wished she heard. As Wilk v. Vencill demonstrates, reliance has no
cautionary value except, perhaps, in those cases in which the promisor observes
the acts of reliance, is fully aware that those acts are in response to the oral
promise, and has an opportunity to warn the promisee to cease reliance before it
becomes detrimental. 2 ° With the exception of this latter situation, reliance serves
no channeling function. Reliance as a basis for enforcement requires that one
114. 180 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1947).
115. Id. at 353.
116. See Fuller, supra note 17.
117. See id. at 801 n.5 (quoting from Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? 40 YALE L.J. 704, 738
(1941), "[iln all legal systems the effort is to find definite marks which shall at once include the promises which
ought to be enforceable, exclude those which ought not to be, and signalize those which will be").
118. Under the California Statute of Frauds, as under most, the writing must be signed only by the
"party to be charged." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West Supp. 2004).
119. See FARNSWORTH CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 79, at 172.
120. See Fuller, supra note 17, at 803.
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view the situation from the perspective of whether the promisor sufficiently
manifested an intention to be bound whether the promisee was reasonable in
relying upon what the promisee perceived to be the promisor's intentions. Rather,
this does not fulfill the function of clarity to which Fuller referred. This factor,
along with our concern over virtual repeal of legislation by judicial decision, is
why we view the California Supreme Court's imposition of limitations on the
principle recognized in Seymour and expanded in Monarco, as so important.
An example from an all-too-typical fact pattern12' will illustrate these points.
Assume that niece Mary packs her bags and comes to California from Ohio for
an extended visit to take care of her elderly Aunt Sara, who was recently injured
in a fall. As time moves along, Sara does not recover well and Mary stays. On
more than one occasion, Sara expresses her gratitude and her desire that Mary
continue to care for Sara for the rest of Sara's life, stating her intent to ensure that
Mary can continue to live in the house for the rest of Mary's life. On one
occasion, Neighbor Ned hears such a statement. Mary stays, providing the
needed care, and eventually Sara dies. Sara leaves no will, and Sara's children,
entitled to the house under the laws of intestate succession, decide to sell the
house.
A written document, whether a will executed by Sara or a contract between
Sara and Mary, would provide evidence of Sara's intention, would evidence that
Sara had given the matter some deliberate thought and was serious in her
intentions, and would signal to a court that Sara intended to be legally bound or
intended a valid testamentary act. Mary's reliance fulfills none of these functions.
Mary can testify to her memories of her conversations with her Aunt. If he
survives Sara, Neighbor Ned's testimony to the same effect may be useful.
However, the mere fact that Mary stayed on to care for Aunt Sara is not probative
evidence that Sara made any promise. Mary stayed and provided care before
Sara made the alleged promise. Mary's recollections of Aunt Sara's promises
may be accurate reflections or they may be the product of wishful thinking on
long afternoons at times when Mary wished that she could be relieved of the
burden she was carrying. Perhaps more likely, Mary's now vivid recollections of
Aunt Sara's promises have some foundation in fact but have been embellished
and made more certain than they were originally. 2  Ned admires Mary's
sacrifices and may be victim of the same impulse to add what he wishes Sara had
said to what he actually heard.
121. See, e.g., discussion of Owens 1, infra text accompanying notes 131-34; discussion of McCabe,
infra text accompanying notes 140-42.
122. See Davis G. Payne et al., Memory Illusions: Recalling, Recognizing, and Recollecting Events That
Never Occurred, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 261 (1996). Distortions of memory are discussed in David L.
Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 182 (1999). With each article is an extensive list of references.
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Assuming that Sara made oral promises, Mary's reliance does not fulfill
Fuller's cautionary function. Sara has made what might have been casual
statements of appreciation and of good intentions toward Mary. It might have
been another matter had Mary drafted a contract or will and invited Sara to sign
it. Mary probably never said words to the effect: "OK, Auntie, since you
promised me a life estate in the house, I'll stay on with you." Short of such a
statement, there is no evidence that Sara was even aware that Mary was relying
on her promise. The promise did not outwardly cause any change in Mary's
behavior. Additionally, Sara never was faced with the critical point where she
had to commit herself legally or where failure to say "no" would bind her.
As Fuller stated, and as can be seen in this hypothetical situation, the three
functions of the Statute of Frauds overlap to a degree.'23 However, the often
overlooked channeling function assumes great significance in this factual
context. The example has all of the makings of a first-class family dispute and
perhaps an extensive court fight in which society will devote substantial judicial
resources to the question of who has the right to use of Sara's house for the
remainder of Mary's life. It is true that rules of law that require a writing do not
avoid all disputes. We may still witness such phenomena as handwriting experts
testifying as to the likelihood of forgery. But enforcement of the writing
requirement will ordinarily reduce these expensive and harrowing disputes to a
minimum. Providing for enforcement based upon reliance has the opposite effect.
Requiring clear and convincing evidence of Sara's promise would not
seemingly resolve the concerns expressed here. It would purport to affect the
evidentiary standard but would not resolve the evidentiary dispute or serve any
cautionary or channeling function.
Fuller compared forms of law with those of language noting that "in both
fields the actual course of history is determined by a continuous process of
compromise between those who wish to preserve the existing patterns and those
who wish to rearrange them.' '124 He stated that "there are times when [judges,
legislators and text writers], like lexicographers, must acquiesce in the
innovations of the layman. '"2 5 However this process does not always produce
sound developments. Fuller continued: "If language sometimes loses valuable
distinctions by being too tolerant, the law has lost valuable institutions, like the
seal, by being too liberal in interpreting them."'
' 26
123. See Fuller, supra note 17, at 803.
124. Id. at 802-803.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Legal acceptance of detrimental reliance as an all-purpose solution to
problems ranging from gratuitous promises to lack of a required writing may fall
into this category."'
IV. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CASES
During the period prior to Monarco in which the use of equitable estoppel to
avoid the statute of frauds was being developed, the California Supreme Court
decided another line of cases in which enforcement of an oral agreement subject
to the statute of frauds was based on the need to prevent unjust enrichment,
without any mention of estoppel. As early as 1868, the court held in Sandfoss v.
Jones18 that an oral agreement by the defendants to reconvey property to the
plaintiff could be enforced to prevent use of the land sale provision of the statute
of frauds to facilitate unjust enrichment. The court said, "To allow the
defendants ... to evade their promise, would be to enable them to practice a
fraud [on the original grantor], and convert a statute designed to prevent frauds
into a shield for their protection. 1 2 9 The case was cited correctly in Justice
Traynor's opinion in Monarco as one in which the court had enforced an oral
promise subject to the statute of frauds to prevent unjust enrichment despite the
fact that estoppel was not mentioned in the court's opinion in Sandfoss. 3'
In Owens v. McNally, ("Owens I")' the plaintiff sought to enforce her
uncle's oral promise to leave his property to her if she would move to California
and provide care for him. She performed, providing the services requested until
her uncle's remarriage two years before his death. At his death, the uncle left no
will and his property passed by intestate succession to his widow.' 32 The niece
brought suit seeking specific performance of the uncle's oral promise. The trial
court held for the uncle's estate and the widow on the ground that the oral
promise was unenforceable under the land sale provision of the California statute
127. Several important articles have been published in recent years that explore the wisdom and
propriety of utilizing reliance as a basis for promise enforcement. The authors of those articles present
contrasting views concerning not only what the law should be but even interpreting the direction in which
courts have been heading in recent years. For a thorough and fair summary of this scholarship up to early 1998,
see Knapp, supra note 82. A sampling of significant publications since 1998 might include Randy E. Barnett,
Forward: Is Reliance Still Dead, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2001), Juliet P. Krostritsky, The Rise and Fall of
Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really As Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at
the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002), Robyn L. Meadows, Symposium on Revised Article I and
Proposed Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Code Arrogance at Displacement of Common Law and Equity: A
Defense of Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 535 (2001).
128. 35 Cal. 481 (1868).
129. Id. at 489.
130. Monarco v. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737, 746 (Cal. 1950).
131. 45 P. 710 (Cal. 1896).
132. ld. at 711.
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of frauds.3 3 The supreme court affirmed. But in its opinion the court defined and
endorsed a doctrine that it described as "supported by the overwhelming weight
of authority" in other jurisdictions under which a promise like that made by the
deceased uncle would be enforced.'" Under that doctrine, enforcement would be
granted in similar cases where the services performed are of a peculiar personal
nature not readily capable of money valuation. Quoting from Jaffee v.
Jacobsen,35 the court said:
We concede the law to be that a court of equity will specifically enforce
a promise to leave to another the whole or a definite portion of one's
estate as a reward for peculiar personal services rendered, or other acts
done by the promisee, which are not susceptible of money valuation, and
were not intended to be paid for in money, provided the consideration
has been substantially received at the promisee's [sic] death. 36
The court then went on to explain that,
[T]he reason for the interposition of equity is quite obvious. Plaintiff has
rendered service of extraordinary and exceptional character, such service
as in contemplation of the parties was not to be compensated for in
money, and, as in contemplation of law, cannot be compensated for in
money. Therefore, by no action at law could a plaintiff be restored to his
original position. It would be in the nature of a fraud upon him to deny
any relief, and, the law failing by reason of its universality, equity, to
promote justice, makes good its imperfections.' 37
The court, however, concluded that granting the equitable remedy sought by
the niece would be improper under the specific facts of the case because it would
unfairly deprive the uncle's widow of her inheritance under circumstances
unknown to her at the time of their marriage.'38 As a result the court concluded,
the plaintiff would have to resort to an action in quantum meruit.1
39
133. Id. At the time the California statute of frauds did not deal with a promise or agreement to make a
will. See discussion supra note 86 and accompanying text.
134. See Owens 1, 45 P. at 711-12.
135. 48F. 21, 24 (lst Cir. 1891).
136. Owens 1, 45 P. at 711-12.
137. Id. at 712.
138. Id. at 713. In a second decision, the court concluded that real property acquired by the deceased
uncle prior to his remarriage and used by him and his niece as their home until the uncle's remarriage had been
the subject of a completed lifetime gift to the niece, which she was entitled to keep as against the uncle's
widow. Owens v. McNally, 56 P. 615 (Cal. 1899) [hereinafter Owens I1].
139. See Owens 1, 45 P. at 712.
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Six years later, in McCabe v. Healy,'40 the court ruled in favor of a similarly
situated nephew who lived with his uncle and cared for the uncle's property for
many years prior to the uncle's death, in reliance on the uncle's oral promises
that the uncle's property would belong to the nephew at the uncle's death, and
that the uncle would execute a will to accomplish that result. 4 ' Quoting Professor
Pomeroy's respected treatise on specific performance, the California Supreme
Court said:
Courts of equity will, under special circumstances, enforce a contract to
make a will, or to make a certain testamentary disposition; and this may
be done even when the agreement was parol, where, in reliance upon the
contract, the promisee has changed his condition and relations so that a
refusal to complete the agreement would be a fraud upon him. The relief
is granted, not by ordering a will to be made, but by regarding the
property in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees, or representatives
of the deceased promisor, as impressed with a trust in favor of the
plaintiff, and by compelling defendant.., to make such disposition of
the property as will carry out the intent of the agreement.' 2
The court followed dictum from Owens I to the effect that equity will
specifically enforce a promise made in exchange for personal services that are
not susceptible to monetary valuation. The relief that the plaintiff sought and that
the court granted made use of what is now commonly recognized as a
constructive trust '4 in lieu of specific performance of the promise, which would
no longer be possible because of the death of the promisor.
The principle recognized in Owens I and applied in McCabe v. Healy, was
further developed in a line of subsequent California Supreme Court cases decided
prior to Monarco. In some the principle was applied,'" while in others relief was
denied on the ground that the services rendered by the plaintiff had been or could
'45be adequately compensated in money, or that the promise to be enforced lacked
certainty.'46 In these cases, however, no concern was expressed about enforcing
an oral contract within the California statute of frauds, nor was there any mention
of estoppel. The principle being applied was based entirely on the use of
equitable remedies, specific performance or a constructive trust to accomplish
"quasi-specific performance," to prevent unjust enrichment.
140. 70 P. 1008 (Cal. 1902).
141. Id. at 1008-09.
142. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
143. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 83 (6th ed. 1987).
144. See generally Rogers v. Schotterback, 138 P. 728 (Cal. 1914); Steinberger v. Young, 165 P. 432
(Cal. 1917); Wolf v. Donahue, 273 P. 547 (Cal. 1929); Aho v. Kusnert, 87 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1939).
145. Baumann v. Kusian, 129 P. 986 (Cal. 1913); Wolfsen v. Smyer, 175 P. 10 (Cal. 1918).
146. Monson v. Monson, 162 P. 90 (Cal. 1916).
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V. FULLER'S THREE FUNCTIONS REVISITED
An equitable action seeking an appropriate remedy based on unjust
enrichment does not involve enforcement of a contract and the writing
requirement of the statute of frauds, dealing only with contracts, is not an issue.
So long as the remedy is limited to requiring one who has been unjustly enriched
to disgorge the property received or paying its fair market value, there is no
reason to invoke any writing requirement because the substantive right being
asserted is based on restitution to avoid unjust enrichment and does not involve
enforcement of a contract. However, we see a pattern of "restitution" in the
broadest sense in cases in which a legally unenforceable oral promise is made. A
promisee relies upon that promise by rendering services to the benefit of the
promisor that cannot be valued in money because of the nature of the services or
of the relationship of the parties; the promise is enforced to prevent unjust
enrichment. Although cast in terms of preventing unjust enrichment, the simple
fact in many of these cases is that the courts were enforcing an oral contract. The
fact of reliance by the promisee and even the fact of receipt of unearned benefit
by the promisor do not always fulfill either an evidentiary, a cautionary or a
channeling function. If, in the prior example, we give Mary a cause of action for
unjust enrichment against her Aunt Sara's estate, and if we then decide that,
because the value of Mary's services from which Aunt Sara benefited is not
readily measured in dollars and cents, the remedy should be measured by the
Aunt's promise, the net result is that we are enforcing that oral promise.4 7 The
statute of frauds defense to the enforcement of the oral contract is gone.
While the common law history in California appears to show the
development of two distinct theories, one involving "quasi specific performance"
or "restitution in kind" and the other involving enforcement of oral contracts
based on reliance, these seemingly parallel lines of cases involve a common
principle. Monarco forced a recognition of this fact. While Justice Traynor noted
the two separate approaches, treating them as distinct,4' either could have
provided the basis of the decision and one might still ponder what the true
holding of the case was.
VI. MONARCO AND ITS PROGENY
In Monarco, the California Supreme Court enforced an oral agreement
between Christie LoGreco and his deceased stepfather, Natale, and Natale's wife,
Carmela, who was Christie's mother. Under that agreement, farm property
owned by Natale and Carmela in joint tenancy was to remain in joint tenancy
until the death of the first spouse and then be passed to Christie by will at the
147. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
148. Monarco v. LoGreco, 220 P.2d 737, 741 (Cal. 1950).
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death of the surviving spouse.4 9 In exchange, Christie promised to forego his
interest in seeking employment elsewhere and remain on the farm to assist the
two of them and the survivor.'5° No express promise was made to reduce the oral
agreement to writing or otherwise memorialize the agreement.'5 '
Shortly before his death, without Carmela's knowledge, Natale dissolved the
joint tenancy and executed a will leaving his interest in the property to his
grandson (Monarco).'52 On Natale's death, Natale's interest in the property was
distributed to the grandson by the probate court. ' The Monarco case began as a
partition action brought by the grandson against Carmela, the surviving spouse,
who retained an undivided one-half interest in the property. Carmela cross-
complained, seeking a ruling that the grandson held Natale's interest as
constructive trustee for Carmela, who was to leave the property to Christie by
will pursuant to the oral agreement.'54 By the time the case reached the California
Supreme Court, Carmela had died, and Christie and others were substituted for
her as the defendants and cross-complainants. '
Christie's case was one that fit within the principle established by dictum in
Owens I and adopted in McCabe v. Healy. Justice Traynor recognized this in his
opinion when he said:
It is settled that neither the remedy of an action at law for damages for
breach of contract nor the quasi-contract remedy for the value of services
rendered is adequate for the breach of a contract to leave property by will
in exchange for services of a peculiar nature involving the assumption or
continuation of a close family relationship. The facts of this case clearly
bring it within the foregoing rule.
15 6
The Court cited Owens I and McCabe v. Healy, the leading unjust
enrichment cases, but chose to rest its decision on the principle established in
Seymour, notwithstanding the absence of an express promise or assurance of a
writing to confirm the oral agreement.5 7 By doing so the court sought to broaden
the use of "estoppel" to avoid the California statute of frauds to permit its use in
cases not previously recognized within the principle established in Seymour
149. Id. at 739.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id..
155. Id. at 739 n.l. The case thus became one in which relief was sought by Christie, the original
promisee, based on the promise made to him by Natale and Carmela in the oral contract in exchange for his
promise to remain in their employ.
156. Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 740-41.
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because there was neither a secondary promise to create a writing nor a
representation that a sufficient writing existed or was not required. Justice
Traynor's opinion refers only to "estoppel," without specifically identifying it as
either "equitable estoppel," as in all the older cases, or "promissory estoppel," as
in the comment in the First Restatement, although his subsequent opinion in
Drennan v. Star Paving Co."'5 makes it clear that he was well versed on the First
Restatement of Contracts, including the commentary on the restatement
sections. 159
In his opinion in Monarco, Justice Traynor characterized an argument made
by the grandson resisting enforcement of the oral contract as follows:
It is contended, however, that an estoppel to plead the statute of
frauds can only arise when there have been representations with
respect to the requirements of the statute indicating that a writing
is not necessary or will be executed or that the statute will not be
relied upon as a defense."6
By using the term "estoppel" without either "equitable" or
"promissory," Justice Traynor avoided the need to be more precise in
identifying the doctrine or doctrines to which he was referring. A false
representation that a writing exists would be a misrepresentation of fact,
giving rise to the use of equitable estoppel under the traditional
formulation of that doctrine."' Estoppel based on a promise to supply a
writing, as in Seymour, would give rise to the use of promissory
estoppel. 62 A representation that "a writing is not necessary," could be
construed as a promise not to assert the statute in defense of an action to
enforce the oral contract. Thus, promissory estoppel would be the
appropriate doctrine, unless it can be shown that the statement was not a
truthful expression of the speaker's belief or a misstatement of the law,
in which case the appropriate doctrine would be equitable estoppel,
based on a misrepresentation. Given the absence of any accompanying
promise or misrepresentation as to a writing, the principle adopted in
Monarco was, in reality, a new principle under which reliance on the oral
contract may be sufficient to justify enforcement of that contract,
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.
158. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1955).
159. In his opinion in Drennan, Justice Traynor relied on a comment on section 45 of the First
Restatement to find, by analogy, an implied promise by a subcontractor not to revoke his bid. Id. at 759-60. In
his opinion in Wilk v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1947), Justice Traynor also used the term "estoppel" without a
qualifier.
160. Monarco, 220 P.2d at 740 (emphasis added).
161. See BIGELOW, supra note 24, at 556.
162. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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The decision in Monarco did not, however, create unlimited opportunities to
use estoppel to avoid the California statute of frauds. There was no virtual repeal
of that legislation. In his opinion Justice Traynor said:
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been
consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would
result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances.
Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result
from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been
induced by the other seriously to change his position in reliance on the
contract [citing, among other cases, Wilk v. Vencill, Vierra v. Pereira,
Wilson v. Bailey, and Seymour], or in the unjust enrichment that would
result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's performance
were allowed to rely upon the statute. 
63
The novel principle recognized in this formulation was one under which
enforcement of an oral contract would be allowed notwithstanding an applicable
statute of frauds, in cases where enforcement could not be based on either
equitable or promissory estoppel under the existing authority. Where failure to
enforce the oral contract results in unjust enrichment of the party against whom
enforcement is sought, the unjust enrichment cases recognized enforcement of
the contract as the appropriate remedy in cases where the services or other
performance by the party seeking enforcement were of a peculiar personal nature
not readily compensated in money. 6" Unless the court was using the term "unjust
enrichment" in Monarco to mean something different than its meaning in the
prior unjust enrichment cases, no new principle was needed to justify
enforcement of the oral contract. Nor was it necessary to use the principle
established in Seymour by expanding it. Quite clearly, Justice Traynor intended
to significantly liberalize the law of California on the use of "estoppel" to avoid
the California statute of frauds and blend the "unjust enrichment" principle with
the estoppel principle recognized in the prior cases to create a new and much
broader principle.
Just a year after its decision in Monarco, the court demonstrated the
importance of the specific elements of the principle used in Monarco to avoid the
statute of frauds in another opinion by Justice Traynor in Ruinello v. Murray.165
The plaintiff in that case sought to enforce an oral contract of employment for a
term of five years. Unlike Seymour, there was no promise or assurance by the
defendant to provide a written contract. However, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense to
163. Monarco, 220 P.2d at 739-40 (emphasis added).
164. See generally Owens 1, 45 P. 710 (Cal. 1896).
165. 227 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1951).
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his action under the court's earlier decision in Monarco.'6 Affirming the trial
court's ruling sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiffs complaint, the court held
that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show either an unconscionable
injury to him or unjust enrichment of the employer if the oral agreement was not
enforced.' 67 Although it might be argued that the court was refusing to do in
Ruinello what it intentionally sought to do in Monarco, the court rested its
decision in Ruinello on the lack of any unconscionable injury to the plaintiff or
unjust enrichment of the defendant,'68 thus reaffirming the necessity of satisfying
the elements of the principle used in Monarco.
The plaintiff in Ruinello claimed that he had given up a "permanent life-time
position"'6 9 with his former employer, in a job held for almost twenty years, to
accept employment with the defendant. 7 0 The court concluded that these
allegations were not sufficient under the test established in Monarco. In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Traynor said:
Plaintiff alleges that he resigned a "permanent life-time" position under
an oral contract with another employer to enter defendant's employ. This
allegation does not show that plaintiff will suffer an unconscionable
injury if the oral contract with defendant is not enforced. Ordinarily a
contract for permanent employment, for life employment, for so long as
the employee chooses, or for other terms indicating permanent
employment, is interpreted as a contract for an indefinite period
terminable at the will of either party, unless it is based on some
consideration other than the services to be rendered. ... Since plaintiff
has not alleged any such consideration or other terms indicating a
contrary intention, it cannot be concluded that the employment he gave
up was not at the will of either party. The leaving of such employment
for employment with defendant that is also terminable at the will of
either party because of the statute of frauds does not result in
unconscionable injury. '7'
166. Id. at 253.
167. Id. at 253-54.
168. id. at 253.
169. Id. at 252.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 253 (citations omitted). With this focus upon the requirement that unconscionable injury
involve harm of significant magnitude, it seems all the more evident that Wilk v. Vencill is the inconsistent link
in the chain of cases on this subject.
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The court also concluded that the defendant would not be unjustly enriched if
the contract was not enforced because the plaintiff failed to allege that the value
of the services he rendered prior to his discharge exceeded the compensation paid
to him for those services.7
Although lacking the colorful history, Ruinello appears at first glance to be
factually similar to Seymour. The two distinctions are that (1) no promise of a
written contract was made to Mr. Ruinello as it was to Captain Seymour, and (2)
Captain Seymour relied on the promise of a written contract to give up a secure
"civil service" position whereas Mr. Ruinello left a terminable-at-will job which,
despite his twenty-two years of employment, was not viewed as relinquishing a
legal right.
In Seymour the California Supreme Court used what is now described as
promissory estoppel to enforce the promise to supply a signed, written contract.
Since there was no such subsidiary promise in Ruinello, the court was forced to
consider the case on the basis of the new principle established in Monarco. The
court's refusal to use that principle on the facts in Ruinello demonstrates that the
elements required to establish a basis for "estoppel" are different and more
stringent where there has been no secondary promise to supply a written contract
or representation that such a writing exists. These more stringent elements create
a significant limitation on the use of the principle as compared to that used in
Seymour. 1
73
Since 1951 when Ruinello was decided, the California Supreme Court has
not considered a case involving an attempt to avoid the statute of frauds by the
use of estoppel in the factual context of a long-term employment contract. The
reported decisions by the District Courts of Appeals appear consistent in
applying the standards established in the earlier supreme court cases. 74 The most
frequently cited Court of Appeals case involving this issue is Munoz v. Kaiser
172. Id.
173. In his opinions in Monarco and Ruinello, Justice Traynor made no reference to any requirement
that proof of the oral agreement be by "full, clear and convincing evidence." Ruinello did not involve a contract
or promise to make a disposition of property at death by will or otherwise, as did Notten v. Mensing. Beyond
that, the decision in Ruinello was for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to make his case for relief under
the elements required in Monarco. But Monarco was a case involving an oral contract to dispose of property at
the death of the surviving spouse, thus making it more like Notten v. Mensing and the subsequent cases
involving contracts or promises to make a will, where the court had consistently required proof of the oral
contract by "full, clear, and convincing evidence." Justice Traynor's failure to address the standard of proof in
Monarco indicates that, so long as the test for unconscionable injury to the promisee or unjust enrichment of the
promisor is satisfied under the customary standard of proof, the "full, clear, and convincing" standard does not
apply. However, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2) (1979), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 294-98, 301-02, one of the "factors" to be considered in applying the rule in subsection
139(1) is "the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the
promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence." (emphasis
added).
174. See, e.g., Lange v. TIG Ins. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999); Malmstrom v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Steel Corporation.'75 In that case the plaintiff, who was unemployed at the time,
sold his home in Texas and moved with his family to California to work as an
employee of the defendant under what he believed to be an oral three-year
employment contract. 76 After five months, his employment was terminated
because the defendant was downsizing its operations. The plaintiff subsequently
was unable to get new employment and ultimately lost his home through
foreclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
expressing the belief that the supervisor's statement was not sufficient to create a
firm contract for a term of three years. The appellate court affirmed on the
ground that a contract for a term of three years, if one were proved, was
unenforceable under the one-year provision of the California statute of frauds.' 77
In response to the plaintiffs argument that his contract was enforceable based on
estoppel notwithstanding the statute, the court said, "[t]he touchstone under
California law is unjust enrichment of the party to be estopped or unconscionable
injury to the other party.' ' 8 Quoting Ruinello, the court said, "[n]o unjust
enrichment results when the promisee has received the reasonable value of his
services.' 79 And in rejecting the plaintiffs claim of unconscionable injury the
court said:
[Plaintiff] must set forth his rights under the contract given up and show
that they were so valuable that unconscionable injury would result from
refusing to enforce the oral contract with defendant .... Contrary to an
allegation in plaintiffs pleadings, he did not relinquish existing
employment to accept the job with Kaiser. He was unemployed at the
time, having lost two jobs within a period of about six months in
Texas. 80
The appellate court expressed no opinion on the question whether the result
would have been different had the plaintiff in fact given up employment in Texas
to accept employment with the defendant. However, under the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Ruinello, in the absence of employment for a specific term, the
plaintiffs employment would have been at will, and giving up employment at
will is not sufficient to create unconscionable injury. Munoz, although perhaps
175. 203 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1984).
176. The plaintiff's impression that his employment was for a term of at least three years was based on a
statement by his hiring supervisor that the position for which he was being employed would require three years
of on-the-job training. Id. at 347.
177. Munoz, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
178. Id. at 349.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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involving facts somewhat weaker than those in Ruinello, is an example of the
district courts' refusal to relax the rules established in Monarco and Ruinello.
s8
In Day v. Greene'82 the California Supreme Court considered the first in a
short line of cases involving oral promises or agreements to make a will or
testamentary disposition decided after Monarco. Day v. Greene and the cases
which followed it were all decided during the period when the California statute
of frauds still required that such a promise or agreement be evidenced by a
sufficient writing.' The court in Day affirmed a decision by the trial court that
the statute of frauds did not bar the plaintiffs action to impose a constructive
trust on a one-seventh interest in property passing under her deceased
stepmother's will to her stepmother's six children, to the exclusion of the
plaintiff. Her claim was based on an oral agreement between the stepmother and
her predeceased husband, the plaintiffs father, calling for a disposition of their
property at the death of the survivor to the seven children of both spouses
equally. Relying on Monarco, rather than Notten v. Mensing or the prior cases
based on the dictum in Owens I, Justice Gibson, writing for a unanimous court,
said:
We are of the view that the trial court correctly determined that the
statute of frauds did not render the agreement unenforceable. ... [A]
party will be estopped from relying on the statute where fraud would
result from refusal to enforce an oral contract. The doctrine of estoppel
has been applied where an unconscionable injury would result from
denying enforcement after one party has been induced to make a serious
change of position in reliance on the contract or where unjust enrichment
would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's
performance were allowed to invoke the statute.... [B]oth of these
grounds were found to be present hereI
Factually, Day v. Greene bears a strong resemblance to the case presented
earlier in Notten v. Mensing. In Notten, the court similarly enforced an oral
agreement to make a will to prevent unjust enrichment based solely on the
surviving spouse's acceptance of benefits under the predeceased spouse's will
executed in accordance with their oral agreement. By its decision in Day v.
181. In Oracle v. Falotti, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001), the court, applying California law,
refused to enforce an alleged oral sixteen month extension of the plaintiffs employment contract under the
principle established in Seymour and Monarco, because the plaintiff had failed to show sufficient detrimental
reliance on the extension. This decision, like that in Munoz, seems to confirm the conclusion that the rule for
use of estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds in the context of an employment relationship is not being softened
from its formulation in Ruinello.
182. 380 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1963).
183. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) (repealed 1973); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (West Supp. 2004).
184. Day, 380 P.2d at 385 (quoting Monarco).
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Greene, the California Supreme Court recognized the application of Monarco,
this time in a case more obviously involving a claim by a third party beneficiary
under an oral agreement to make a will. In his opinion for a unanimous court,
Justice Gibson made no mention of the unjust enrichment cases decided before
Monarco, like McCabe v. Healy, 85 or the requirement recognized in Notten v.
Mensing'86 that the oral agreement be proved by "full, clear, and convincing
evidence." This seems to confirm the conclusion suggested above, that the "full,
clear, and convincing" evidence requirement was not applicable where the
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment test from Monarco was met.187
In a subsequent case, Redke v. Silvertrust, 88 the court reached a result similar
to that in Day v. Greene. Citing both Monarco and Notten v. Mensing, the court
confirmed its intent to make the principle recognized in Monarco applicable to
this type of third party beneficiary case. However, the case for estoppel in Redke
v. Silvertrust was somewhat stronger than that in the prior cases. In that case the
wife owned a substantial amount of separate property.'89 Some time after the oral
agreement and the execution of wills and trust documents by both spouses to
carry out their oral agreement, the wife, who had terminal cancer, threatened to
modify her will and intervivos trust to make her daughter, the plaintiff, her sole
beneficiary, to the exclusion of her husband and her husband's children.,9 The
husband assured her that, at his death, he would leave to the plaintiff the property
acquired from his wife.' 9' In reliance on that assurance, his wife left her will and
trust unchanged. 92 Following her death, the husband remarried and then changed
his will and trust to eliminate any provision for the plaintiff.' 93 The court
concluded that the injury that would be suffered by the plaintiff if the oral
agreement was not enforced would be unconscionable, thus bringing the case
squarely within the principle established in Monarco.'9" Here, as in Notten v.
Mensing, the reliance on the oral agreement was by the plaintiffs mother, not the
plaintiff. But unlike Notten v. Mensing, the court did not expressly require that
the oral agreement be proven by "full, clear, and convincing evidence."
185. 70 P. 1008 (Cal. 1902).
186. 45 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1935).
187. See supra note 173.
188. 490P.2d 805 (Cal. 1971).
189. Id. at 807.
190. Id. at 808.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 808-09.
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Again this requirement was not considered and apparently inapplicable
where the elements for relief under Monarco were established.' 95
In Crail v. Blakley, 96 the court recognized the rights of a third party
beneficiary based on an oral agreement as to the testamentary disposition of
marital property. The trial court found that a deceased husband and his
predeceased wife had orally agreed that their property remaining at the death of
the surviving spouse should be given to their children.' 97 Wills to effectuate this
disposition were executed.'98 The wife died first, by her own hand, and the
husband, an attorney, 99 thereafter changed his will, disposing of all but one-
fourteenth of the property, including his predeceased wife's share, to others. 20°
The plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on an interest in the property
for their benefit.20 ' The defendants claimed that the oral agreement was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that this was not an appropriate
case in which to recognize an estoppel under Monarco, because there was no
proof of reliance on the oral agreement by the plaintiffs or the predeceased wife,
who also derived no benefit under the agreement.
The evidence showed, however, that the wife had expressed to others her fear
that her husband would change his mind and pressure her to change their agreed
disposition of their property and her intent to commit suicide to prevent that from
happening and force her surviving husband to abide by their agreement. In
response to the defendant's argument that the wife had not relied on their oral
agreement, the court said:
[S]he evidently assumed that so long as she were alive, Mr. Crail might
prevail upon her to rescind the agreement. Therefore, in an act of
ultimate reliance upon the oral agreement, she took her life with the firm
195. In Baglione v. Wagner, the court rejected a claim by a decedent's widow, Marie, to a share of her
deceased husband's property based on an oral agreement between the spouses that all of their property would
become the property of the survivor at the death of the first spouse. The court concluded that there was no
showing of unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment if the oral agreement was not enforced. Justice Traynor,
writing for a unanimous court, said:
Marie has not alleged any serious change of position in reliance on the contract.... Her
injury is merely the loss of the benefit of a bargain within the statute. Nor will the devisees be
unjustly enriched if the contract is not enforced. They take through Peter [the deceased
husband], and since he died first, he received no benefits under the contract.
417 P.2d 683, 688 (Cal. 1966) (citations omitted).
There is no mention of the stricter standard of proof required under Notten v. Mensing. The plaintiffs
claim was measured only against the elements required under Monarco.
196. 505 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1973).
197. Id. at 1031.
198. Id. at 1029.
199. Id. at 1032.
200. Id. at 1029.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1033.
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belief that by doing so, her husband's compliance with the agreement
would be assured. °3
As is characteristic of these third party beneficiary cases, the reliance used to
support an estoppel was that of the contracting party, not that of the third party
seeking enforcement. Nevertheless, the court concluded: "[T]he estoppel arises
from Mr. Crail's continuing silence while Mrs. Crail seriously changed her
position in reliance on his initial promise. '2°u There is no mention of Monarco in
Justice Burke's opinion for a unanimous court. However, the opinion relied
heavily on Redke v. Silvertrust,20' a more recent case in which the standard for
estoppel established in Monarco was followed. Justice Burke noted, "The
evidence disclosing the existence of the oral agreement is sparse but is substantial
enough to constitute support for the trial court's findings. ''2°6 Although the court
apparently felt that in this case proof of the oral agreement had been by "full,
clear and convincing" evidence,2 7 it said:
That standard was adopted, however, for the edification and guidance of
the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review.
"The sufficiency of the evidence to establish a given fact, where the law
requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a
question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial
evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to
review on appeal."2 °8
Monarco, and the subsequent California Supreme Court cases, appear to
have eliminated use of the "full, clear, and convincing" standard of proof, even in
the trial court, where the elements under Monarco have been satisfied.2 9
203. Id. at 1033.
204. Id.
205. Redke v. Silvertrust, 490 P.2d 805 (Cal. 1971).
206. Crail, 505 P.2d at 1029.
207. See id. at 1032.
208. Id. (quoting from National Automobile Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 206 P.2d
841 (Cal. 1949)). The court's conclusion appears to be consistent with the standard for appellate review in other
areas of California law where proof by clear and convincing evidence is required. See id. and cases cited
therein.
209. However, at least one recent opinion from a District Court of Appeal suggests that the "full, clear,
and convincing" standard applies even in cases where the elements under Monarco are satisfied, independent of
the adoption of that standard in 2000 in CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700 (West Supp. 2004). See Estate of Honsley,
65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997).
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In Notten v. Mensing, the California Supreme Court recognized and
commented on the risk inherent in enforcement of an oral agreement in cases of
this kind where both parties to the agreement are deceased, saying: "We are well
aware that in such cases the temptation is strong for those who are so inclined to
fabricate evidence giving color to the claim that the parties entered into an oral
agreement as is here alleged." 210 It was for this reason that the court required
proof of the oral agreement by "full, clear, and convincing evidence,""' to permit
enforcement without the required writing. Today, the California Probate Code
deals expressly with the standard of proof required to prove an oral agreement to
"make a will or devise or other instrument, or not to revoke a will or devise or
other instrument, or to die intestate," requiring proof by "clear and convincing
evidence" as an alternative to the required writing. The code provisions also
permit enforcement, in the alternative, where the promise on which the claim is
based "is enforceable in equity."2 3 The reference to an oral contract "enforceable
in equity," was intended to refer to situations where the oral promise would be
enforceable under the estoppel principle or specific restitution." ' This statement
of the requirement for enforcement without a writing in the alternative permits
enforcement of the oral agreement either on the basis of proof of the agreement
that satisfies the "full, clear and convincing" test from Notten v. Mensing or proof
showing an unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment under Monarco.
VII. THE BROKER CASES
The California courts have been willing to apply the principles established in
Seymour and Monarco to most of the cases discussed above, a majority of which
involved contracts to make a will or a transfer of property effective at death.
However, the court has been more restrictive in its approach to oral promises to
pay commissions for services as an agent in a transaction involving real property.
210. Notten v. Mensing, 45 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1935). The language is quoted and relied on by the
District Court in Estate of Honsley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997).
211. Notten, 45 P.2d at 198.
212. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700(a)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 2004).
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. The Analysis of AB 1491, which created California Probate Code section 21700, by the Assembly
Committee on the Judiciary, refers, in its description of existing law, to recent cases in the California District
Courts of Appeals in which a promise to make a will was enforced under Monarco, notwithstanding a
requirements in old Probate Code section 150 (repealed by AB 1491) that a contract to make a will be in
writing, saying, "[a]lthough Probate Code section 150 has stated the traditional rule prohibiting oral contracts to
leave assets to particular beneficiaries, a number of courts recently refused its strict application in favor of
various equitable considerations such as promissory estoppel and quasi-specific performance .... [T]he bill
appropriately reflects these court rulings so that the language of the statute will be consistent with the law as it
currently exists." ASSEMBLY COMMITTrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1491, at 3-4 (Jan.
11,2000).
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In Marks v. Walter G. McCarthy Corporation,"5 decided one year before
Monarco, a licensed real estate broker sought to enforce the seller's oral
agreement to pay a commission on the sale of the Beverly-Wilshire Hotel. The
California Supreme Court refused, saying:
To recover a commission on a contract authorizing a broker to sell real
estate, the broker must prove not only the existence of an agreement and
procurement of a willing purchaser but must meet the requirement of the
statute of frauds which declares that such an agreement "is invalid unless
the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged, or his agent.2 6
In Pacific Southwest Development Corporation v. Western Pacific Railroad
Company,2 7 decided six years after Monarco, a licensed real estate broker sought
to recover a commission in connection with the procurement of an option giving
the defendant the right to purchase real property. The defense was based on the
lack of a sufficient writing. 2 8 The broker argued, among other things, that it was
entitled to enforce the defendant's oral agreement with respect to the payment of
a commission under the principle used in Monarco.2'9 The court affirmed a
summary judgement for the defendant. 20 The majority noted that the plaintiff had
not alleged facts sufficient to establish grounds for an estoppel to plead the
statute of frauds.22' It concluded that the allegations of the complaint showed
neither an unconscionable injury to the plaintiff nor unjust enrichment of the
defendant if the oral agreement were not enforced. The court said, "Plaintiff is a
licensed real estate broker and, as such, is presumed to know that contracts for
real estate commissions are invalid and unenforceable unless put in writing and
subscribed by the person to be charged." 222 In Pacific Southwest, it is evident that
the defendant was enriched. It received free broker's services. It is also evident
that the broker was injured. It performed valuable services for which it was not
215. 205 P.2d 1025 (Cal. 1949).
216. See id. at 1027 (citing California Civil Code section 1624(5) and California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1973(5)).
217. 301 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1956).
218. Id. at 829-30.
219. Id. at 830-31.
220. Id. at 831.
221. Id. at 830-3 1. Three justices dissented, one on the ground that the oral contract was enforceable
under Monarco. Id. at 831-33.
222. Id. at 831. The court reached a similar result in another case in which a licensed real estate broker
sought a commission under an oral listing agreement for finding a qualified buyer for the defendant's real
property, relying on Pacific Southwest Development Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. the court noted,
"[pilaintiff herein has neither alleged nor urged the application of an equitable estoppel, pursuant to which
doctrine a party to an oral agreement might be estopped to rely on the statute of frauds in instances where the
elements of the doctrine can be established." Franklin v. Hansen, 381 P.2d 386, 390 (Cal. 1963).
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compensated. The majority focused on the fact that, as a broker, plaintiff is
"presumed to know" the requirement of a writing.223 The unstated premise must
be that plaintiffs reliance on the oral agreement was unreasonable and thus its
injury is not "unconscionable." For the same reason, the defendant's retention of
its enrichment was not "unjust." One is again reminded of the odd link in the
chain, the Wilk case, in which the plaintiff whose reliance was found to make the
oral promise to sell real property enforceable was an attorney who might also be
"presumed to know the law. 224 The majority in Pacific Southwest expressed
concern that the use of the principle used in Monarco would "defeat the purpose
of the statute of frauds in relation to real estate transactions, 225 without stating
that purpose. This is a general concern noted in many of the broker cases.226 If a
broker who completes a sale under an oral listing agreement can ordinarily
recover based on a theory of estoppel or unjust enrichment, then the legislation
imposing a writing requirement for real estate listings is effectively repealed. In
the process of performing the oral contact and earning the commission, the
realtor will have always relied, thereby suffering detriment and conferring a
benefit upon the defendant. If those elements are found to be sufficient, oral
listing agreements will always be enforced despite the statutory prohibition.227
Some limitation must be recognized to prevent the exception from devouring the
statute that created this specific writing requirement.
In 1985, in Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.,225 the court considered a case in which
a director of the defendant corporation, who was not a licensed real estate broker
but had been active in the real estate business for 20 years, sought to recover a
fee for finding a buyer for the defendant's real property. The case was based on
the defendant's president's oral promise to pay plaintiff a 10% finder's fee, and
the plaintiff's reliance on that promise.229 Six weeks after being elected a director
of the corporation, the plaintiff learned of the corporations financial difficulties
and its pressing need to find a buyer for its corporate headquarters . Shortly
thereafter, the corporation's president, Joseph Tushinski, with whom the plaintiff
served on the board of directors of an unrelated charitable organization, implored
223. Pac. Southwest Dev. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 301 P.2d 825, 831 (Cal. 1956).
224. Supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
225. Pac. Southwest Dev. Corp., 301 P.2d at 831.
226. See, e.g., Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., Inc., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
227. One could foresee the occasional situation in which an executory oral contract for a real estate
listing is repudiated by the owner leading to potential lawsuit by the broker who has not yet changed position in
reliance nor conferred any benefit. In this situation, the statutory requirement of a writing could not likely be
avoided by the plaintiff. However, where the service is rendered and the owner refuses to pay, it would appear
that foreseeable reliance will produce unconscionability if the contract is not enforced and a significant
enrichment will have been conferred on the owner as to which retention without compensation would appear to
be unjust. However, there remains the issue of the reasonableness of the reliance.
228. 702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
229. Id. at 214.
230. Id. at 213.
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the plaintiff to seek a suitable buyer for the property.3' The court said, "[n]either
Tenzer nor Tushinski discussed the need to reduce the finder's fee agreement to
writing. Tenzer felt that their personal relationship and Tushinski's integrity were
sufficient assurance that he would be paid."12 In reliance on Tushinski's oral
promise, the plaintiff revealed to Tushinski the name of the prospective buyer
found by the plaintiff, who purchased the property soon thereafter.
2 33
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff
appealed, claiming, among other things, that the defendant should be estopped to
assert the statute of frauds as a defense because of the plaintiffs reliance on
Tushinski's oral promise.2 34 The California Supreme Court concluded that the
grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, stating that the plaintiffs
allegations were sufficient to suggest a case for estoppel based on the unjust
enrichment of the defendant under Monarco.23 The court distinguished Pacific
Southwest Development Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. on the ground that
it and similar cases involved licensed real estate brokers and this plaintiff was not
a broker. In a footnote, the court said:
We note that the rules withholding traditional equitable remedies, such as
recovery in quantum meruit and the doctrine of estoppel, from real estate
brokers have been vigorously criticized .... Whether or not there is
merit in these arguments, we reserve for another day the question
whether licensed brokers may invoke equitable remedies to avoid the
sometimes harsh results of the statute of frauds.236
The issue reserved in Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. was decided against the
licensed broker two years later in Phillippe.23' The plaintiff, Phillippe, was
engaged by the defendant, a large developer of real estate holding a California
real estate broker's license, with licensed real estate brokers on its staff, to find
available property in certain specific areas of Southern California suitable for
development for tract housing.23s Prince, then the defendant's director of land
acquisitions, orally promised Phillippe a broker's commission for any land
submitted by Phillippe that was actually purchased by the defendant. 239 The court
231. Id. at 213-14.
232. Id. at 214.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 215.
235. Id. at 217-18.
236. Id. at 217 n.6. The criticisms referred to are in Brian M. Englund, Oral Employment Contracts and
Equitable Estoppel: The Real Estate Broker as Victim, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1975), HARRY D. MILLER,
MILLER & STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE, § 1:54, at 669-74 (1975), and Frederick Innes
Fox, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CAL. L. REV. 590 (1965).
237. Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, Inc., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
238. Id. at 1279-8 1.
239. Id. at 1280.
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does not state whether there was a specific commission agreed upon at that time.
In 1973, Phillippe wrote to Prince to tell him of a 94 acre parcel that was
available.2'4In his letter he stated that if the property was purchased, his firm was
to be paid a 6% commission. He received no response. Again in 1974, he wrote
to the defendant, this time to a vice president named Aaron, himself a licensed
broker, regarding the same property. 4' In that letter there was reference to the
commission specified in the prior correspondence. 42 Again, there was no
response. In 1975, Aaron contacted the owner of the property directly and
learned that 63 acres of the property were still available. The parties then
negotiated and consummated a sale and purchase of the property in August 1976,
for $2,718,750.243 The documents for the sale made no reference to a commission
and none was paid to Philippe or his firm.24 When Phillippe inquired about his
commission, he was informed that none would be paid. He brought suit and
obtained a judgment for $125,000, based on Prince's oral promise to pay a
commission, which the trial court found enforceable based on an "equitable
estoppel. 245 The defendant appealed and the court reversed with directions to the
trial court to enter judgment for the defendant, holding that a licensed broker was
not entitled to use "equitable estoppel" to prevent the defendant from avoiding
enforcement of its oral promise under the statute of frauds.246 The court said: "In
allowing equitable estoppel in Tenzer, we carefully distinguished between
unlicensed finders and licensed brokers., 247 Noting that licensed brokers were
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1280-81.
242. Id. at 1281.
243. Id.
244. Id..
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1291. Although the court based its decision on the absence of a sufficient writing signed by
the defendant, the court also said:
A writing signed by Shapell is not all that is lacking. The alleged oral commission agreement
entered into in January was devoid of specifics.... We need not decide whether the absence
of one or more such specifics would be fatal to the alleged agreement. The total lack of
meaningful terms and conditions is the problem. Under the oral agreement, Shapell could
have been charged with a commission for any property presented at any time by Phillippe.
Such open-ended liability is unacceptable.
Id. at 1284.
This appears to be an inappropriate observation by the court. The oral promise of the defendant's director
of land acquisitions was only to pay a commission on land actually acquired by the defendant. And, under the
complaint, Phillippe was seeking a commission only on land submitted to the defendant in writing with a stated
commission of "6% of the total consideration." Id. at 1280. The purchase price actually paid by the defendant
for the property purchased would provide the basis for computing Phillippe's commission. Under section 33 of
the Second Restatement, "[t]he terms of a contract are [sufficient to satisfy the certainty requirement stated in
that section] if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy." Under that rule, followed in California, it would appear that the contract on which the plaintiff was
seeking recovery would satisfy the certainty requirement.
247. Id. at 1285.
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required to know the law relating to their business activities, the court said,
"Licensed brokers are conclusively presumed to know the requirements of [the
statute of frauds]." 24' The court then concluded that, in view of this presumed
knowledge, denying the broker a commission for services performed under the
oral agreement would not create an unconscionable injury to the broker or unjust
enrichment of the buyer for whom the services were rendered, stating:
We hold that a licensed real estate broker or salesperson cannot assert
equitable estoppel against a statute of frauds defense to an oral
commission agreement that is subject to [the statute of frauds] unless
there is a showing of actual fraud by the party to be charged under the
invalid oral agreement. Because licensed brokers are involved in almost
every real estate sale, to decide otherwise would be to eviscerate if not
abrogate [the statute of frauds] .' 4
The court went on to mount a strong defense of the statute of frauds based on
the underlying policy considerations,250 which, it concluded, are as important
today as they were when the statute was first enacted in England in 1677. The
court also noted a broadening of the statute by the California legislature to
expand consumer protections saying: "[w]e believe the legislative preference for
written contracts is stronger than ever before.,
25
'
The court's opinion, authored by Justice Eagleson and supported by four
2512other justices, drew a strong dissent from Justices Kaufman and Brousard. In
addition to disagreeing with the majority on the issue involved, the dissenters
also disagreed with the majority's views regarding the strength of the statute of
frauds in California. They asserted that the same court had taken a very different
view as to the strength of the statute in a case decided in 1985, Asdourian v.
Araj,15 stating:
[A]s this court has recently recognized in circumstances strikingly
similar to those in the case at bar, the policies underlying the statute of
248. Id. at 1286.
249. Id. at 1288. The use of the term "actual fraud" is noteworthy. It would appear to denote judicial
awareness of the fact that the use of the term "fraud" to describe the act of asserting the statute of frauds as a
defense in reliance cases is a perversion of standard legal vocabulary. The result in Phillippe may be consistent
with illustration 3 in comment c of section 139 of the Second Restatement.
250. Id. at 1288-89.
251. Id. at 1289. In one area in which estoppel has been widely used to avoid a defense based on the
Statute of Frauds, the California Legislature has recently demonstrated its willingness to weaken the writing
requirement rather than strengthen or extend it. In 2000, the California Probate Code was amended to permit
enforcement of an oral agreement to make a will or similar disposition shown by "clear and convincing
evidence," or "enforceable in equity." CAL. PROB. CODE § 21700(4) (West Supp. 2004); see also text
accompanying notes 214-15.
252. Including two District Court of Appeal justices assigned pro tem.
253. 696 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1985).
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frauds are not uniformly implicated in every case, and in any event such
policies must be considered in light of the equitable interests of the
plaintiff and the economic realities of the particular transaction.254
The majority distinguished Asdourian v. Araj on the ground that the defense
in that case, asserted by a builder being sued by an owner, was based on a writing
requirement in the Business and Profession Code, which did not expressly state
that an oral agreement in violation was "unenforceable.
' 25
In Seymour, the California Supreme Court said, "[w]e can see no good
reason for limiting the operation of this equitable doctrine to any particular class
of contracts included within the statute of frauds .... However, this is what
the court did by exclusion almost eighty years later in Phillippe. The majority in
Phillippe based its decision on the policy behind the statute of frauds provision
requiring contracts by which an "agent, broker, or any other person '' 27 is
employed to buy or sell real estate, and the regulatory legislation governing
licensed brokers, stating, "[l]icensed brokers are conclusively presumed to know
the requirements of [the statute of frauds governing their employment] .,,258 As the
dissent points out in its restatement of the facts, 29 Phillippe was not the case the
legislature had in mind when it enacted the statutory writing requirement relied
on by the majority. The plaintiff was a relatively small, independent real estate
broker, while the defendant was a large, publicly-held corporation widely active
in the acquisition and development of residential real property for sale to the
public. The defendant corporation and its vice president, Aaron, were licensed
brokers.
The majority in Phillippe also found support for its decision in the prior
California cases denying a licensed broker recovery in quantum meruit for
services under an oral agreement.2 6 These cases, however, rely on the theory that
allowing recovery for the fair value of the broker's services would frustrate the
purpose of the writing requirement in the statute of frauds. 26' This theory has been
rejected in cases where estoppel is asserted to avoid the statute of frauds,
262beginning with Seymour, where the court recognized that use of the statute of
frauds as a defense in these cases would permit the statute to be used to
254. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1296 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1289, n.12.
256. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88, 94 (Cal. 1909).
257. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(a)(4) (West Supp. 2004).
258. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286. Similar statements can be found in Pacific Southwest Development
Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 301 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1956), and Marks v. Walter G. McCarthy Corp., 205
P.2d 1025 (Cal. 1949).
259. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1297-99 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 1287-88.
261. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375 cmt. a, illus. 3 (1979).
262. See Seymour v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88 (Cal. 1909).
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perpetrate fraud rather than prevent it. The majority in Phillippe apparently did
not see the defendant's use of the statute of frauds as the perpetration of a fraud.
The opinion states: "Phillippe did nothing more than perform services pursuant to
an invalid agreement. Phillippe's reliance on the oral contract was not
reasonable, and he therefore suffered no unconscionable injury. '263
The majority in Phillippe relied on a distinction between performance and
reliance, characterizing Phillippe's actions in reliance on his oral contract with
the defendant as "nothing more than"264 performance of the services required of
him under the "invalid agreement." However, the same might be said of
Christie's actions in Monarco in reliance on his oral contract with Natale and
Carmela. Similarly, in some of the cases involving contracts to make wills, the
actions in reliance could be viewed as performance of the oral contract.265 In a
1987 article 266 Professor Juliet Kostritsky "advances the thesis that promissory
estoppel can best be understood, not as a ground for recovery independent of
bargain-enforcement, but rather as a subsidiary means of identifying bargains
deserving of enforcement. 267 Certainly that is true where the doctrine is used, as
it was in Monarco, to permit enforcement of an oral contract otherwise made
unenforceable by the statute of frauds. In this light, reliance that also serves as
performance or part performance must still be seen as reliance.
The policy justification for the majority opinion in Phillippe lies in the
court's conclusion that enforcement of the oral promise to pay the plaintiff a
commission in that case based on Monarco, would virtually eliminate the
statutory requirement in California that every agreement in which a broker,
agent, or other person is employed in connection with the sale or purchase of real
property be evidenced by a sufficient writing.268 On this point, the majority and
the dissenters parted company. The majority concluded that an absolute rule was
needed to prevent this result; the dissenters felt an absolute rule against
enforcement was improper and that it would be more appropriate to consider the
case on its facts, assessing the relative strength, sophistication, and bargaining
power of the parties. The dissenters' restatement of the facts suggests how they
saw the case: "Shapell, a major firm engaged in the acquisition and development
of real property, contacted Phillippe, the proprietor of a small brokerage firm.,
269
263. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1287.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Day v. Greene, 380 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1963); Redke v. Silvertrust, 490 P.d 805 (Cal. 1971).
266. See Kostritsky, supra note 127.
267. See Knapp, supra note 82, at 1211.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
269. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1298 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
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The dissent's conclusion was that, "[i]t is difficult to conceive a more
suitable occasion for the assertion of equitable estoppel."275
The principles established in Seymour and Monarco, are equitable principles.
One of the attributes of equity jurisprudence is flexibility. Seymour and the
estoppel cases that have followed it demonstrate this flexibility in finding a way
to avoid the misuse of the statute of frauds in a manner that would undermine the
purpose of that legislation. And yet, reviewing the facts in Phillippe as restated
by the dissenters, 7' the result produced by the majority decision appears to be
such a misuse of the statute. Notwithstanding criticisms of the principle followed
in Phillippe,272 a majority of the court has favorably cited and relied on the
273decision in at least one other recent case.
VIII. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN ARTICLE 2
The California Supreme Court has not as yet passed on the question whether
the principle established in Seymour, or that recognized in Monarco, applies with
respect to the statute of frauds in section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial
270. Id. at 1299 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). The unstated assumption that all realtors are in control and
their customers are naive innocents is not justified. The newspaper The Independent Voice of Dixon, California,
in its October 21, 1998 edition, published a retrospective column by John Dawson. Mr. Dawson related a
transaction that occurred shortly after he returned to his home town to embark on a career as a real estate agent.
Being new in this line of work, he was thrilled when Hans Rohwer, the three-time mayor of Dixon, a main-
street businessman, and a leading citizen approached Dawson, advising him that Rohwer was the executor of his
mother's estate and wanted Dawson to take a listing for the sale of the three family farms.
Dawson took notes on the various details such as mineral rights and stated that he would be back shortly
with a listing agreement for Hans' signature. Dawson wrote: "[h]e looked me straight in the eye and stated
rather sternly that if he couldn't do business with a man on a handshake, he'd rather not do business at all....
Later, when another broker who had a potential buyer wanted to go around me and thereby get all the
commission, I was not concerned. Mr. Rohwer and I had shaken hands. That was as good as a contract written
in blood."
Dawson sold the properties and received his commission. Had the executor died before the commission
was paid leaving the realtor, Dawson, to collect from his estate, the matter could have ended up in court. On
appeal, the California Supreme Court would apparently have denied relief, wishing us to believe that young
Dawson should have simply walked away from the transaction. John V. Dawson, Curmudgeon's Corner,
INDEPENDENT VOICE, available at http://www.independentvoice.com/columns/curmudgeons-archive
2
.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
271. See Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1293 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
272. See Englund, supra note 236; Fox, supra note 236 at 602, 609.
273. Chambers v. Kay, 56 P.3d 645 (Cal. 2002). The case involved an attempt by one attorney to
enforce an oral fee-splitting agreement with another attorney, which, under Rule 2-200 of the California Rules
of Professional Conduct with respect to attorneys, is required to be in writing. The court affirmed a decision by
the District Court of Appeals denying enforcement of the oral agreement, refusing to apply the principle
established in Seymour, notwithstanding the plaintiff's alleged reliance on the defendant's promise to supply the
required writing. This extension of Phillippe raises questions as to which professionals or licensed parties may
be denied use of the principle established in Seymour, based on their knowledge or presumed knowledge. In this
context, it is interesting to note that Wilks v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1947), in which the California Supreme
Court unanimously subscribed to Justice Traynor's opinion allowing enforcement of an oral agreement to sell
real property based on a seller's promise to supply a writing, involved an attorney seeking to enforce the oral
agreement.
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Code.174 Section 2-201 provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section a
contract.., is not enforceable ... unless there is some writing .... ." Section 2-
201 sets forth circumstances in which the writing requirement does not preclude
enforcement, but there is no mention of unjust enrichment or estoppel. 27' Thus, a
literal reading of 2-201 leads to the conclusion that these concepts are not
available under the UCC.
The cases in other jurisdictions are divided on the use of promissory or other
estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds in Article 2.276 The only reported California
case on the subject is Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Winery,177 decided in 1988
in the District Court of Appeal. In an earlier case decided the same year, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the view that, under California
law, the writing requirement in section 2-201 could not be avoided by use of
promissory or other estoppel. 27' However, the California District Court of Appeal
rejected this reasoning and recognized the estoppel principle as a means by which
to avoid the statutory writing requirement. 279 The court relied heavily on section
1-1032s° to support its conclusion that the estoppel principle can be used to avoid
the writing requirement in section 2-201.
IX. THE CALIFORNIA PRINCIPLES AND THE RESTATEMENT
Seymour and subsequent cases involving similar facts in which Seymour was
followed establish that an oral contract will be enforced in California
notwithstanding an applicable statute of frauds where the oral agreement is
accompanied by a promise to reduce the agreement to writing and the injury
suffered by the party to whom the promise was made that would result from lack
of enforcement is sufficient. In Seymour, Justice Angellotti referred to an injury
that is "unjust and unconscientious." The estoppel applied in these cases, based
on the accompanying promise to supply a writing, was promissory estoppel, as
recognized later in section 90 of the First Restatement.28' Its use in Seymour was
consistent with the principle recognized in that section, which required, among
other things, reliance of a "definite and substantial character." In fact, illustration
2 of section 90 in the First Restatement involved facts similar to those in
274. CAL. COM. CODE § 2201 (West 2002).
275. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977); David East, The Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule Under
the NCCUSL 2000 Annual Meeting Proposed Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 867 (2001)(describing the statute of frauds provision of the Uniform Commercial Code and discussing whether a writing
requirement should remain with respect to contracts dealing with goods).
276. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-6 (4th ed. 1995).
277. 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct. App. 1988).
278. C. R. Fredrich, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1988).
279. Allied Grape Growers, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
280. CAL. COM. CODE § 1103 (West 2002) states: "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of the
code, the principles of law and equity, including... estoppel ... shall supplement its provisions."
281. See FARNSWORTH CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 79, at 170.
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Seymour. By now, section 90 is a recognized part of California law,282 and
provides a full and complete answer to the question of enforcement in cases
factually like Seymour. Similarly, where the oral contract is accompanied by an
express or implied promise not to assert the statute of frauds as a defense to
enforcement of that contract in the event of breach, the promisee's reliance on
that promise, if otherwise sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 90,
would permit enforcement of the oral contract under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. In situations where there is a misrepresentation as to the present
existence of a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, enforcement of
the oral contract would be permitted under the doctrine of equitable estoppel as
that doctrine has been recognized and applied for more than a century.
2 83
The difficult cases, then, are those arising where enforcement of an oral
contract, for which a writing is required under the statute of frauds is sought in
the absence of an accompanying promise on which promissory estoppel could be
based or misrepresentation of fact on which equitable estoppel could be based.
This was the case presented to the court in Monarco. By its decision in that case,
the court either expanded the principle recognized in Seymour, which appears to
have been Justice Traynor's intent, or adopted a new principle. Although the
court referred to the basis of its decision as "estoppel," without use of either
"promissory" or "equitable," there was no accompanying promise of a writing on
which to base promissory estoppel, as in Seymour, or misrepresentation as to the
existence of a writing on which to base equitable estoppel. The court simply
allowed enforcement of Natale's promise made in the oral contract with Christie
based on Christie's reliance on that contract and the "unconscionable injury" to
Christie and the "unjust enrichment" of Natale and his grandson that would result
from refusing enforcement. This was not the principle recognized in Seymour
under the name of "equitable estoppel," nor was it the principle recognized in
section 90 of the First Restatement, promissory estoppel. In fact, it may not be
estoppel at all.2 4
282. B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACrS, § 248 (9th ed. 1987).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
284. See FARNSWORTH CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 79, at 172. Professor Farnsworth's
comments are addressed to section 139 of the Second Restatement, which was apparently intended to restate the
rule adopted in Monarco. He concludes, "[iun sum, the Restatement (Second) rule is not one of preclusion at all,
and it is misleading to represent it to be a rule of estoppel. The promisor never voluntarily surrenders the
advantage of asserting the statute, as in the cases of equitable estoppel. Nor is there a voluntary undertaking that
could be the basis of promissory estoppel. ... Rather, it is as if an exception had been written into the statute
itself, saying that specified promises were unenforceable except where evidenced by a signed writing and except
where relied upon. Reliance would then be just another way of satisfying the statute of frauds. The rule reflects
a growing judicial hostility to the statute of frauds. But for judges to have openly written an exception into the
statute of frauds would have subjected them to the accusation that they were infringing on the province of
legislators by rewriting the statute. So, having concluded sensibly it well may be that the statute imposed too
great a hardship on relying promisees, they rewrote the statute in the guise of finding preclusions. Courts might,
in the end, have reached the same result by directly confronting the issue instead of circumventing it by
concocting a false estoppel one that is neither equitable nor promissory. In doing so, they might have avoided at
least some of the confusion that attends use of the word estoppel." Id. at 172-73.
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In Monarco, the court did more than simply recognize a new principle
permitting enforcement of an oral contract based on reliance and unconscionable
injury to the promisee. It also incorporated into this new principle the principle
recognized in the earlier unjust enrichment cases under which an oral contract
was enforced where denying enforcement would result in the "unjust
285enrichment" of the other party. Under the rule established in Monarco, an oral
contract subject to a writing requirement in the statute of frauds will be enforced,
notwithstanding the absence of a writing, where one party has relied on the oral
contract, but only where failure to enforce it would result in unconscionable
injury to that party or unjust enrichment of the other party. Although not
expressly recognized in Justice Traynor's formulation of the rule, the cases
factually support the conclusion that the reliance that gives rise to enforcement
must be definite and substantial, reasonable, and reasonably foreseeable by the
party against whom enforcement is sought. s6 All of these elements, taken
together, create limitations on the principle that prevent its overuse to judicially
repeal the statutory writing requirement.
In cases where failure to enforce the oral contract would result in unjust
enrichment, the principle developed and applied in the unjust enrichment cases
decided prior to Monarco provides the appropriate theoretical justification for
enforcement, without the need to rely on Monarco. In those prior cases, the
courts required a showing that the services or other performance rendered in
reliance of the oral contract or promise be of a peculiar personal nature not
287capable of money valuation. In the absence of such a showing, restitution or a
similar principle could be used to provide an adequate monetary remedy based on
the benefit conferred on the promisor as measured by the reasonable value of the
services or other performance provided by the promisee.2" The cases that do not
fit within these principles are those where enforcement is not possible through
the use of promissory or equitable estoppel or through a restitutionary remedy
and enforcement is sought solely on the basis of the injury suffered by the party
who relied on the oral contract.
285. See supra notes 157-65.
286. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1890) stated: "[a] promise reasonably inducing
definite and substantial action is binding. A promise which the promisor should reasonable expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Under
subsection (2) of Second Restatement section 139, "[t]he definite and substantial character of the action or
forbearance," "the reasonableness of the action or forbearance," and the extent to which the action or
forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor" are all significant circumstances in determining whether injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the contract.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 131-47.
288. See Owens v. McNally, 45 P. 710 (Cal. 1896).
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These are obviously the most difficult cases.289 By its decision in Monarco,
the California Supreme Court dealt with exactly such a case, long before the
adoption of the Second Restatement. Under Monarco, enforcement is allowed in
these cases, but only if the reliance is definite and substantial, reasonable and
foreseeable by the other party, and unconscionable injury that would result from
failure to enforce the contract. In its solution, the court established elements that
create significant limitations on the principle, which we believe are necessary to
protect against misuse of the principle.
Following the lead of the California Supreme Court,2" the authors of the
Second Restatement added a new section 139 dealing with enforcement of an
oral "promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third party and which does induce
the action or forbearance notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds... ." Like section
90, this section permits enforcement only if "injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." Although the section deals with "a promise," it
must be read as applying only to promises in oral contracts, since it is only
"contracts" that are subject to the statute of frauds.29" '
The foregoing discussion suggests that section 90 of the Second Restatement
accurately restates the existing law in California dealing with cases factually like
Seymour in which there was a promise to provide a writing, where enforcement
of the oral contract is available based on promissory estoppel under section 90.
The rule in cases in which there has been a misrepresentation as to the present
existence of a writing under which enforcement is available based on equitable
estoppel is alluded to in a comment on section 110, the initial section dealing
289. Professor Farnsworth says:
The promisor, indeed, does nothing whatsoever to lose [the advantage of the statute of
frauds]. The promisor does not lose it by making the promise in the first place, since the
promise is then subject to the [writing] requirement imposed by the statute. And the promisor
does nothing else makes no representation or other promise. It is the promisee that does
something by relying. But on what does the promisee rely? If no additional promise is
required, the argument must be the circular one that the reliance is on the very promise that
the statute declares to be unenforceable, an unreliable promise indeed.
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND, supra note 79, at 172.
290. See supra note 34. The Reporter's Note on section 139 of the Second Restatement cites Crail v.
Blakley, 505 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1973), one of the later "unjust enrichment" cases in which the California Supreme
Court use the principle established in Monarco, discussed in the text at notes 160-64, supra, as a case "adopting
an approach similar to the rule of this Section."
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1979); see also id. § 110, which identifies the
"Classes of Contracts" (emphasis added) covered by the statute of frauds. California Civil Code section 1624
states: "[tihe following contracts are invalid, unless they, or note of memorandum thereof, are in writing .... "
(emphasis added). Under the definition of a Contract in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 1, a
promise enforceable under either section 90 or section 139 would be a "contract." The definition of a "contract"
in California Civil Code section 1549 states: "[a] contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing."
There appears to be no case in California dealing with the question of whether a promise, enforceable on the
basis of promissory estoppel, is a "contract." The materials and cases referred to in the Reporter's Note on
section 139 all deal with contracts subject to the statute of frauds.
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with the statute of frauds.292 Section 139 specifically deals, in subsection 139(b),
with cases in which failure to enforce an oral contract would result in the unjust
enrichment of the promisor, indicating that the appropriate remedy would be a
restitutionary remedy such as that used by the California courts in the unjust
293enrichment cases. The question then is whether the rule stated in section 139 is
consistent with that established in Monarco. We believe it is.
The limitations imposed by the California courts on the principle recognized
in Monarco by careful formulation of the elements of that principle are sound
and necessary to prevent misuse of the principle to repeal, by judicial action, the
statutes of frauds that the California legislature is unwilling or unable to repeal.
These limitations restrict the courts to their proper judicial function. The authors
of the Second Restatement expressed a concern similar to ours as to misuse of the
rule in section 139. A comment on the section states: "[1]ike 90, this section
states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consideration [created by the
courts] is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing [enacted by the
legislature]., 294 The comment goes on to point out that, under the rule in
subsection 139(1), reliance by the promisee must be "foreseeable by the
promisor. 295 It also emphasizes the requirement that enforcement of the oral
contract must be necessary "to avoid injustice," specifically referring to the
"factors" listed in subsection 139(2) as "relevant" in applying this requirement.296
The factors listed, if properly applied, are, we believe, consistent with the
limitations imposed by the California Supreme Court on use of the principle
established in Monarco, and will prevent misuse of section 139.
First is the requirement that consideration be given to "the availability and
adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and restitution.292 Where
the oral contract is enforceable on the basis of promissory estoppel under section
90 or equitable estoppel, section 139 is not needed to provide a remedy for the
party who has relied on the oral contract. Where restitution is available, either
based on the value of the benefit conferred on the party from whom recovery is
sought, or, where that is not appropriate, by enforcement of the oral contract or
promise under the principles recognized in the unjust enrichment cases that
preceded Monarco, section 139 is not needed and, by its terms, should not be
used. In short, it is only in the most difficult cases like Monarco where section
139 is appropriately considered.
The second factor to be considered is the "definite and substantial character" of
the action or forbearance in reliance on the oral contract "in relation to the remedy
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 cmt. d (1979).
293. See supra Part IV.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 cmt. b (1979).
295. Id. § 139.
296. Id. § 139 cmt. b.
297. Id. § 139(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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sought."" This is consistent with the requirement in California under Monarco, that
the injury to the party seeking enforcement of the oral contract if the contract is not
enforced be unconscionable. Where reliance damages are sought to reimburse the
party seeking enforcement for the costs of reliance, this standard could be met rather
easily; where the party seeking enforcement of the oral contract wants to recover
expectation damages based on the value of the performance promised by the other
party, the standard would pose a greater challenge. It is for this reason that we
believe reliance damages would generally be more appropriate than the expectation
damages awarded in the employment cases from other jurisdictions such as McIntosh
v. Murphy and Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice."
The third factor to be considered is "the extent to which the action or forbearance
corroborates the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are
otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence."3"1 The reference to "terms"
is significant and a comment on section 139 suggests that the concern of the authors
was with respect to the cautionary function as well as the evidentiary function
performed by the writing requirement." The alternative evidentiary standard,
requiring "clear and convincing evidence," is consistent with the older California
cases in which the California courts required proof of the oral agreement by "clear
and convincing evidence."'33
Beyond these three specific factors, section 139 requires attention to the
reasonableness of the promisee's reliance"'' and its forseeability by the promisor,' all
of which makes section 139 consistent with Monarco.
The leading employment contract case frequently referred to in connection with
section 139 of the Second Restatement is Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice,/a decided
by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1997, after the adoption of section 139 of the
Second Restatement, on which the Alaska Supreme Court based its decision. The
plaintiff left a position of employment at will with the Gore Vice Presidential
campaign in 1992 to accept an offer of employment in Alaska made to her on behalf
of the state's Democratic Party by the person who was then its chair-elect."" The offer
was of employment for a term of two years, thus implicating the one-year provision
of the statute of frauds.' In reliance on the oral contract of employment, the plaintiff
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970).
300. See Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313 (Alaska 1997).
301. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2)(c) (1979) (emphasis added).
302. Id. § 139 cmt. c.
303. It is also consistent with the alternative standard of proof for enforcement of a promise to make a
will or other testamentary disposition in California Probate Code section 21700.
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2)(d) (1979).
305. Id. § 139(1).
306. Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313 (Alaska 1997).
307. Id. at 1315.
308. Id.
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moved from Maryland to Alaska, only to be denied employment by the party, whose
governing board refused to honor the oral contract made by its chair-elect.0 9 The
Alaska Supreme Court upheld a ruling for the plaintiff in the trial court, using section
139 of the Second Restatement and the award of expectation damages based on the
terms of the oral contract.3 °
In Califomia, under Ruinello and Munoz, the plaintiff in Rice would almost
certainly have been denied recovery. " Giving up employment at will to accept new
employment does not, by itself, create an unconscionable injury; and, because the
plaintiff never actually worked for the defendants, they could not have been unjustly
enriched. Rice was decided in the trial court by a jury and the Alaska Supreme
Court's opinion is largely devoted to the question of whether the jury's verdict for
the plaintiff was reasonable.32 Although the Alaska Supreme Court noted and briefly
discussed the requirements of section 139 of the Second Restatement, on which the
trial judge and the Supreme Court relied,33 incorrectly referring to the rule stated in
that section as one based on "promissory estoppel," no emphasis was placed on these
requirements and the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the jury could
reasonably have found that all of the requirements for relief under section 139 were
satisfied.
We view the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Rice as an improper use of the
rule in section 139. Initially, there appear to be significant questions as to whether the
plaintiff's reliance on the oral contract made with the party's chair-elect was
reasonable and foreseeable, given the chair-elect's position and the circumstances
under which the offer was made. But the biggest question is whether the conclusion
that injustice could be avoided only by enforcement of the chair-elect's offer by an
award of expectation damages was proper. It does not appear that the plaintiff's
action was "of a definite and substantial character... in relation to the remedy
sought," that is, expectation damages. Because the Democratic Party did not
apparently benefit from the plaintiff's action in reliance on the oral offer of
employment, restitution would not be appropriate, and the plaintiffs only case for
recovery would appear to be on the basis of section 139 of the Second Restatement.
However, under a proper reading of section 139, the plaintiff was not entitled to any
recovery. But even if the court was correct in its conclusion that the plaintiff was
entitled to recovery, under section 139 the court is given the opportunity to limit the
plaintiff's recovery to reliance damages based on the costs incurred in reliance on the
309. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court's opinion does not indicate how the chair-elect's offer was accepted
by Rice, if, in fact, it was. The statement of facts says: "Rice asserts that later, in either September or October,
she accepted [the chair-elect's] offer to work for the party in Alaska." Id. at 1315. The opinion contains no
reference to any evidence offered in the trial court with respect to Rice's acceptance.
310. Id. at 1320-21.
311. See supra notes 166-73 and 175-81. The Alaska Supreme Court recognized this in its opinion.
Alaska Democratic Party, 934 P.2d at 1316, n.2.
312. Alaska Democratic Part, 934 P.2d at 1318-19.
313. Id. at 1316-18.
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promise that the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Because the plaintiff's prior employment
was employment at will, her only reliance damages would have been measured by
her costs incurred in relocating to Alaska in reliance on the oral contract of
employment. We believe the decision in favor of the plaintiff in Rice would have
been more appropriate if the court had used the final sentence of subsection 139(1) to
limit the plaintiff's damages to reliance damages.
Although the factors to be considered under section 139 in applying that section
are generally consistent with the limitations imposed by the California Supreme
Court on the use of the principle recognized in Monarco, we view the Restatement
factors as somewhat more specific and more easily applied than the elements that
serve as limitations in California framed in terms of unconscionable injury and unjust
enrichment. The term "unconscionable," for which there is no widely adopted
statutory definition,3'4 appears to be used in this context in California to refer
primarily to substantive as opposed to procedural unconscionability." The definitions
of "unconscionable" supplied to date by the California courts in other contexts have
not been entirely clear or without controversy,t 6 and the application of these
definitions in the context in which it is used in Monarco has yet to be established.
Although the term "unjust enrichment" has come to have a generally understood
meaning in connection with a claim for restitution, it is not clear that this meaning
can be applied uniformly in the context of the principle established in Monarco. For
these reasons we believe the California Supreme Court should expressly recognize
and use the requirements and factors incorporated in the rule stated in section 139,
with emphasis on the need to carefully consider those factors, as a substitute for the
limitations now applied in using the principle established in Monarco. Although the
Restatement formulation of the principle embodied in section 139 has not always
been carefully considered in the cases decided to date in other jurisdictions,3'7 careful
attention to that formulation would sufficiently protect against the evil seen by the
majority of the California Supreme Court in Phillippe that is, judicial repeal of the
statute of frauds.
314. Although "unconscionable" is used in both Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in section
2-302, and its counterpart adopted in California, California Civil Code section 1670.5 and in the Second
Restatement, in section 208, no definition is provided in any of these sources.
315. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485,487-88 (1967).
316. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in
California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995).
317. See McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1970); Alaska Democratic Party, 934 P.2d 1313.
318. See Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, Inc., 734 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).

